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Asymptotic Glosten–Milgrom Equilibrium∗
Cheng Li† and Hao Xing†
Abstract. This paper studies the Glosten–Milgrom model whose risky asset value admits an arbitrary discrete
distribution. In contrast to existing results on insider models, the insider’s optimal strategy in this
model, if it exists, is not of feedback type. Therefore, a weak formulation of equilibrium is proposed.
In this weak formulation, the inconspicuous trade theorem still holds, but the optimality for the
insider’s strategy is not enforced. However, the insider can employ some feedback strategy whose
associated expected proﬁt is close to the optimal value, when the order size is small. Moreover,
this discrepancy converges to zero when the order size diminishes. The existence of such a weak
equilibrium is established, in which the insider’s strategy converges to the Kyle optimal strategy
when the order size goes to zero.
Key words. Glosten–Milgrom model, Kyle model, nonexistence, occupation time, weak convergence
AMS subject classifications. 60G55, 60F05, 49N90
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1. Introduction. In the theory of market microstructure, two models, due to Kyle [16]
and Glosten and Milgrom [13], are particularly inﬂuential. In the Kyle model, buy and sell
orders are batched together by a market maker, who sets a unique price at each auction
date. In the Glosten–Milgrom model, buy and sell orders are executed by the market maker
individually, and hence bid and ask prices appear naturally. In both models,1 an informed
agent (insider) trades to maximize her expected proﬁt utilizing her private information on
the asset fundamental value, while another group of noise traders trade independently of the
fundamental value. The cumulative demand of these noise traders is modeled by a Brownian
motion in the Kyle model, cf. [2], and by the diﬀerence of two independent Poisson processes,
whose jump size is scaled by the order size, in the Glosten–Milgrom model.
When the fundamental value, described by a random variable v˜, has an arbitrary continu-
ous distribution,2 Back [2] establishes a unique equilibrium between the insider and the market
maker. Moreover, the cumulative demand process in the equilibrium connects elegantly to the
theory of ﬁltration enlargement; cf. [18]. However, much less is known about equilibrium in
the Glosten–Milgrom model. Back and Baruch [3] consider a Bernoulli distributed v˜. In this
case, the insider’s optimal strategy is constructed in [9]. Equilibrium with general distribution
of v˜, as Cho [11] puts it, “will be a great challenge to consider.”
∗Received by the editors October 28, 2013; accepted for publication (in revised form) December 15, 2014;
published electronically March 31, 2015.
http://www.siam.org/journals/sifin/6/94312.html
†Department of Statistics, London School of Economics and Political Science, 10 Houghton St, London, WC2A
2AE, UK (c.li25@lse.ac.uk, h.xing@lse.ac.uk).
1A proﬁt maximizing informed agent is introduced in the Glosten–Milgrom model in [3].
2Models with discrete distributed v˜ can be studied similarly as in [2].
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ASYMPTOTIC GLOSTEN–MILGROM EQUILIBRIUM 243
In this paper, we consider the Glosten–Milgrom model whose risky asset value v˜ has a
discrete distribution,
(1.1) P(v˜ = vn) = pn, n = 1, . . . , N,
where N ∈ N ∪ {∞}, (vn)n=1,...,N is an increasing sequence and pn ∈ (0, 1) with
∑N
n=1 pn =
1. This generalizes the setting in [3], where N = 2 is considered, i.e., v˜ has a Bernoulli
distribution.
In models of insider trading, inconspicuous trade theorem is commonly observed; cf., e.g.,
[16], [2], [4], [3], [10], and [8] for equilibria of the Kyle type, and [9] for the Glosten–Milgrom
equilibrium with Bernoulli distributed fundamental value. The inconspicuous trade theorem
states that when the insider is trading optimally in equilibrium, the cumulative net orders from
both insider and noise traders have the same distribution as the net orders from noise traders,
i.e., the insider is able to hide her trades among noise trades. As a consequence, this allows
the market maker to set the trading price only considering current cumulative noise trades.
Moreover, in all aforementioned studies, the insider’s optimal strategy is of feedback form,
which only depends on the current cumulative total order. This functional form is associated
to optimizers of the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation for the insider’s optimization
problem. However, the situation is dramatically diﬀerent in the Glosten–Milgrom model
with N in (1.1) at least 3. Theorem 2.6 below shows that, given the aforementioned pricing
mechanism, the insider’s optimal strategy, if it exists, does not correspond to optimizers of
the HJB equation. This result is a consequence of the diﬀerence between bid and ask prices
in the Glosten–Milgrom model, which is in contrast to the unique price in the Kyle model.
Therefore, to establish equilibrium in these Glosten–Milgrom models, we propose a weak
formulation of equilibrium in Deﬁnition 2.11, which is motivated by the convergence of
Glosten–Milgrom equilibria to the Kyle equilibrium, as the order size diminishes and the
trading intensities increase to inﬁnity; cf. [3] and [9]. In this weak formulation, the insider
still trades to enforce the inconspicuous trading theorem, but the insider’s strategy may not
be optimal. However, the insider can employ some feedback strategy so that the loss to her
expected proﬁt (compared to the optimal value) is small for a small order size. Moreover, this
gap converges to zero when the order size vanishes. We call this weak formulation asymptotic
Glosten–Milgrom equilibrium and establish its existence in Theorem 2.12.
In the asymptotic Glosten–Milgrom equilibrium, the insider’s strategy is constructed ex-
plicitly in section 5, using a similar construction as in [9]. Using this strategy, the insider
trades toward a middle level of an interval, driving the total demand process into this interval
at the terminal date. This bridge behavior is widely observed in the aforementioned studies
on insider trading. On the other hand, the insider’s strategy is of feedback form. Hence,
the insider can determine her trading intensity only using the current cumulative total de-
mand. Moreover, as the order size diminishes, the family of suboptimal strategies converge
to the optimal strategy in the Kyle model; cf. Theorem 2.13. In such an asymptotic Glosten–
Milgrom equilibrium, the insider loses some expected proﬁt. The expression of this proﬁt loss
is quite interesting mathematically: it is the diﬀerence of two stochastic integrals with respect
to (scaled) Poisson occupation time. As the order size vanishes, both integrals converge to
the same stochastic integral with respect to Brownian local time, and hence their diﬀerence
vanishes.D
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244 CHENG LI AND HAO XING
The paper is organized as follows. The main results are presented in section 2. The
mismatch between the insider’s optimal strategy and optimizers for the HJB equation is
proved in section 3. Then a family of suboptimal strategies are characterized and constructed
in sections 4 and 5. Finally, the existence of asymptotic equilibrium is established in section 6,
and a technical result is proved in the appendix.
2. Main results.
2.1. The model. We consider a continuous time market for a risky and a risk free as-
set. The risk free interest rate is normalized to 0, i.e., the risk free asset is regarded as the
nume´raire. We assume that the fundamental value of the risky asset v˜ has a discrete distri-
bution of type (1.1). This fundamental value will be revealed to all market participants at a
ﬁnite time horizon, say 1, at which point the market will terminate.
The microstructure of the market and the interaction of market participants are modeled
similarly to [3], which we recall below. There are three types of agents: uninformed/noise
traders, an informed trader/insider, and a market maker, all of whom are risk neutral. These
agents share the same view toward future randomness of the market, but they possess diﬀerent
information. Therefore, the probability space (Ω,P) with diﬀerent ﬁltration accommodates
the following processes:
• Noise traders trade for liquidity or hedging reasons which are independent of the
fundamental value v˜. The cumulative demand Z is described by the diﬀerence of two
independent jump processes ZB and ZS which are the cumulative buy and sell orders,
respectively. Therefore, Z = ZB − ZS and it is independent of v˜. Noise traders only
submit orders of ﬁxed sized δ every time they trade. As in [3], ZB/δ and ZS/δ are
assumed to be independent Poisson processes with constant intensity β. Let (FZt )t∈[0,1]
be the smallest ﬁltration generated by Z and satisfying the usual conditions. Then
(FZt )t∈[0,1] describes the information structure of noise traders.
• The insider knows the fundamental value v˜ at time 0 and observes the market price
for the risky asset between time 0 and 1. The insider also submits orders of ﬁxed size
δ in every trade and tries to maximize her expected proﬁt. The cumulative demand
from the insider is denoted by X := XB −XS, where XB and XS are cumulative buy
and sell orders, respectively. Since the insider observes the market price of the risky
asset, she can back out the dynamics of noise orders; cf. discussions after Deﬁnition
2.1. Therefore, the information structure of the insider FIt includes FZt and σ(v˜) for
any t ∈ [0, 1].
• A competitive market maker only observes the aggregation of the informed and noise
trades, so he cannot distinguish between informed and noise trades. Given Y := X+Z,
the information of the market maker is (FYt )t∈[0,1] generated by Y and satisﬁes the
usual conditions. As the market maker is risk neutral, the competition will force him
to set the market price as E[v˜|FYt ], t ∈ [0, 1].
In order to deﬁne equilibrium in the market, let us ﬁrst describe admissible actions for the
market maker and the insider. The market maker looks for a Markovian pricing mechanism,
in which the price of the risky asset at time t is set using cumulative order Yt and a pricing
rule p.D
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Definition 2.1. A function p : δZ× [0, 1] → R is a pricing rule if
(i) y → p(y, t) is strictly increasing for each t ∈ [0, 1);
(ii) limy→−∞ p(y, t) = v1 and limy→∞ p(y, t) = vN for each t ∈ [0, 1];
(iii) t → p(y, t) is continuous for each y ∈ δZ.
The monotonicity of y → p(y, t) in (i) is natural. It implies that the market price is higher
whenever the demand is higher. Moreover, because of the monotonicity, the insider fully
observes the uninformed orders Z by inverting the price process and subtracting her orders
from the total orders. Item (ii) means that the range of the pricing rule is wide enough to
price in every possibility of fundamental value.
The insider trades to maximize her expected proﬁt. Her admissible strategy is deﬁned as
follows.
Definition 2.2. The strategy (XB ,XS ;FI) is admissible if
(i) FI is a ﬁltration satisfying the usual conditions and generated by σ(v˜), FZ , and H,
where (Ht)t∈[0,1] is a ﬁltration independent of v˜ and FZ ;
(ii) XB and XS with XB0 = X
S
0 = 0 are FI-adapted and integrable3 increasing point
processes with jump size δ;
(iii) the (FI ,P)-dual predictable projections of XB and XS are absolutely continuous with
respect to time, and hence XB and XS admit FI-intensities θB and θS, respectively;
(iv) E[
∫ 1
0 |p(Yt, t)| |dXit − δθitdt|] < ∞ for i ∈ {B,S} and the pricing rule p ﬁxed by the
market maker. Here, |Xi − ∫ ·0 δθidt| is the variation of the compensated point process.
This set of admissible strategies is similar to [9, Deﬁnition 2.2]. Item (i) assumes that the
insider is allowed to possess additional information H, independent of v˜ and FZ , which she
uses to generate her mixed strategy. Item (iv) implies δE[
∫ 1
0 |p(Yt, t)| θitdt] < ∞, and hence
the expected proﬁt of the insider is ﬁnite. Item (ii) does not exclude the insider trading at
the same time with noise traders. When the insider submits an order at the same time when
an uniformed order arrives but in the opposite direction, assuming the market maker only ob-
serves the net demand implies that such pair of trades goes unnoticed by the market maker.
This pair of opposite orders will be executed without a need for a market maker. Hence, the
market maker only knows the transaction when there is a need for him. Henceforth, when the
insider makes a trade at the same time with an uninformed trader but in an opposite direction,
we say the insider cancels the noise trades. On the other hand, item (ii) also allows the insider
to trade at the same time with noise traders in the same direction. We say that the insider tops
up noise orders in this situation. However, the insider does not submit such orders in equilib-
rium, even when equilibrium is deﬁned in a weak sense; cf. Remark 4.6 below. The assumption
that the insider is allowed to trade at the same time as noise traders is diﬀerent from assump-
tions for the Kyle model where the insider’s strategy is predictable. This additional freedom
for the insider is not the source for Theorem 2.6 below, which states that optimizers for the
insider’s HJB equation do not correspond to the optimal strategy; see Remark 2.8 below.
As described in the last paragraph, the insider’s cumulative buy orders may consist of
three components: XB,B arrives at diﬀerent time than those of ZB, XB,T arrives at the same
time as some orders of ZB , and XB,S cancels some orders of ZS. Sell orders XS are deﬁned
analogously. Therefore, XB = XB,B +XB,T +XB,S and XS = XS,S +XS,T +XS,B .
3That is, E[XB1 ] and E[X
S
1 ] are both ﬁnite.D
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246 CHENG LI AND HAO XING
As mentioned earlier, the insider aims to maximize her expected proﬁt. Given an admis-
sible trading strategy X = XB − XS , the associated proﬁt at time 1 of the insider is given
by ∫ 1
0
Xt−dp(Yt, t) + (v˜ − p(Y1, 1))X1.
The last term appears due to a potential discrepancy between the market price and the
liquidation value. Since X is of ﬁnite variation and X0 = 0, applying integration by parts
rewrites the proﬁt as
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt, t)) dXBt −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt, t)) dXSt
=
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt− + δ, t)) dXB,Bt +
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt− + 2δ, t)) dXB,T
+
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt−, t)) dXB,St −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt− − δ, t)) dXS,St
−
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt− − 2δ, t)) dXS,T −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt−, t)) dXS,Bt ,
where Y increases (resp., decreases) δ when XB,B (resp., XS,S) jumps by δ, Y increases (resp.,
decreases) 2δ when XB,T (resp., XS,T ) jumps at the same time with ZB (resp., ZS), and Y
is unchanged when XS,B (resp., XB,S) jumps at the same time with ZB (resp., ZS). Deﬁne
a(y, t) := p(y + δ, t) and b(y, t) := p(y − δ, t),
which can be viewed as ask and bid prices, respectively. Then the expected proﬁt of the
insider conditional on her information can be expressed as
E
[∫ 1
0
(v˜ − a(Yt−, t)) dXB,Bt +
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt−, t)) dXB,St
+
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − a(Yt− + δ, t)) dXB,Tt −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − b(Yt− − δ, t)) dXS,Tt
−
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − b(Yt−, t)) dXS,St −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yt−, t)) dXS,Bt
∣∣∣v˜] .
(2.1)
Having described the market structure, an equilibrium between the market maker and the
insider is deﬁned as in [3].
Definition 2.3. A Glosten–Milgrom equilibrium is a quadruplet (p,XB ,XS ,FI) such that
(i) given (XB ,XS ;FI), p is a rational pricing rule, i.e., p(Yt, t) = E[v˜|FYt ] for t ∈ [0, 1];
(ii) given p, (XB ,XS ;FI) is an admissible strategy maximizing (2.1).
When N = 2, [9] establishes the existence of Glosten–Milgrom equilibria. In equilibrium
the pricing rule is
(2.2) p(y, t) = EP
y
[P (Z1−t)] , (y, t) ∈ δZ× [0, 1].Do
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Here, Py is a probability measure under which Z is the diﬀerence of two independent Poisson
processes and Py(Z0 = y) = 1. P is a nondecreasing function such that P (Z1) has the same
distribution as v˜. Moreover, the optimal strategy of the insider are given by jump processes
Xi,j, i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B,T, S}, with intensities δ θi,j(Yt−, t), t ∈ [0, 1]. These intensities
are deterministic functions of the state variable Y , and hence this control strategy is a feedback
control and it corresponds to optimizers of the insider’s HJB equation. However, when N ≥ 3,
Theorem 2.6 below shows that, given the pricing rule (2.2), the optimal strategy does not
correspond to optimizers in the HJB equation for some values of v˜. This result is surprising
because it is contrast to existing results in the Kyle and Glosten–Milgrom equilibria; cf. [16],
[2], [4], [3], [10], [8], and [9]. This mismatch is a consequence of the discrete state space of the
demand process in the Glosten–Milgrom model. The discrete state space yields diﬀerent bid
and ask prices, which is in contrast to the unique price in the Kyle model. See Remark 2.7
below for more discussion.
2.2. Nonexistence of a feedback optimal control. To state the aforementioned result,
we introduce additional notation. For each δ > 0, let Ωδ = D([0, 1], δZ) be the space of δZ-
valued ca`dla`g functions on [0, 1] with coordinate process Zδ; (FZ,δt )t∈[0,1] is the minimal right
continuous and complete ﬁltration generated by Zδ, and Pδ is the probability measure under
which Zδ is the diﬀerence of two independent Poisson processes starting from 0 with the same
jump size δ and intensity βδ. We denote by Pδ,y the probability measure under which Zδ0 = y
a.s. Henceforth, the superscript δ indicates the trading size in the Glosten–Milgrom model.
For the fundamental value v˜δ , let us ﬁrst consider the following family of distributions.
Assumption 2.4. Given v˜δ of type (1.1), there exists a δZ ∪ {−∞,∞}-valued strictly
increasing sequence (aδn)n=1,...,N+1
4 with aδ1 = −∞, aδN+1 = ∞, and
⋃N
n=1[a
δ
n, a
δ
n+1) = δZ ∪
{−∞}, such that
(2.3) P(v˜δ = vn) = P
δ
(
Zδ1 ∈ [aδn, aδn+1)
)
, n = 1, . . . , N.
For any v˜ with discrete distribution (1.1), Lemma 6.1 below shows that there exists a
sequence (v˜δ)δ>0, each satisfying Assumption 2.4 and converging to v˜ in law as δ ↓ 0. There-
fore, any v˜ of type (1.1) can be approximated by a v˜δ satisfying Assumption 2.4. Given v˜δ
satisfying Assumption 2.4, deﬁne
(2.4) hδn(y, t) := P
δ,y
(
Zδ1−t ∈ [aδn, aδn+1)
)
, y ∈ δZ, t ∈ [0, 1], n ∈ {1, . . . , N},
and
(2.5) pδ(y, t) :=
N∑
n=1
vnh
δ
n(y, t) = E
δ,y
[
P (Zδ1−t)
]
,
where the expectation is taken under Pδ,y and
(2.6) P (y) = vn when y ∈ [aδn, aδn+1).
4When N = ∞, N + 1 = ∞.Do
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Then (2.3) implies that v˜δ and P (Zδ1) have the same distribution. If p
δ is chosen as the pricing
rule, it has the same form as in (2.2). Finally, we impose a technical condition on pδ. This
assumption is clearly satisﬁed when N is ﬁnite.
Assumption 2.5. There exist positive constants C and n such that |pδ(y, t)| ≤ C(1 + |y|n)
for any (y, t) ∈ δZ × [0, 1].
Given the pricing rule (2.5), let us ﬁrst study the insider’s optimization problem and derive
the associated HJB equation via a heuristic argument. In this derivation, the superscript δ
is omitted to simplify notation. Deﬁnition 2.2(iii) implies that Xi,j − δ ∫ ·0 θi,jr dr deﬁnes an
FI -martingale for i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B,T, S}. On the other hand, Deﬁnition 2.2(iv) and
[7, Chapter I, T6] combined imply that
∫ ·
0(v˜ − p(Yr− + δ, r))(dXB,Br − δθB,Br dr) =
∫ ·
0(v˜ −
p(Yr, r))(dX
B,B
r − δθB,Br dr) is an FI -martingale. A similar argument applied to other terms
allows us to rewrite (2.1) as
δE
[ ∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yr− + δ, r))θB,Br dr +
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yr−, r))θB,Sr dr
+
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yr− + 2δ, r))θB,Tr dr −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yr− − δ, r))θS,Sr dr
−
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yr−, r))θS,Br dr −
∫ 1
0
(v˜ − p(Yr− − 2δ, r))θS,Tr dr
∣∣∣v˜].
This motivates us to deﬁne the following value function for the insider:
V δ(v˜, y, t) := sup
θi,j ; i∈{B,S},j∈{B,T,S}
δE
[ ∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yr− + δ, r))θB,Br dr +
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yr−, r))θB,Sr dr
+
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yr− + 2δ, r))θB,Tr dr −
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yr− − δ, r))θS,Sr dr
−
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yr−, r))θS,Br dr −
∫ 1
t
(v˜ − p(Yr− − 2δ, r))θS,Tr dr
∣∣∣Yt = y, v˜
]
(2.7)
for v˜ = {v1, . . . , vN}, y ∈ δZ, t ∈ [0, 1). The terminal value of V δ is deﬁned as V δ(v˜, y, 1) =
limt→1 V δ(v˜, y, t).5 Lemma 3.2 and Proposition 4.4 below show that the optimization problem
in (2.7) is well deﬁned and nontrivial, i.e., 0 < V δ < ∞ for each δ > 0. Let us now derive
the HJB equation which V δ satisﬁes via a heuristic argument. Note that the positive (resp.,
negative) part of Y is Y B := XB,B+XB,T+ZB−XS,B (resp., Y S := XS,S+XS,T+ZS−XB,S).
Hence, Y B − δ ∫ ·0(β− θS,Br − θB,Tr ) dr− δ ∫ ·0 θB,Br dr− 2δ ∫ ·0 θB,Tr dr (resp., Y S − δ ∫ ·0(β− θB,Sr −
θS,Tr ) dr − δ
∫ ·
0 θ
S,S
r dr − 2δ
∫ t
0 θ
S,T
r dr) is an FI -martingale.6 Then applying Itoˆ’s formula to
5Since the set of admissible control is unbounded, the HJB equation associated to (2.7) usually admits a
boundary layer, i.e., limt→1 V δ(v˜, y, t) is not identically zero even if there is no terminal proﬁt in (2.1). Such a
phenomenon also shows up in the Kyle model; see [2].
6As discussed after Deﬁnition 2.2, the set of jumps of XB,S and XS,T (resp., XS,B and XB,T ) arrive
at the same time as some jumps of ZS (resp., ZB), and then we necessarily have θB,S + θS,T ≤ β (resp.,
θS,B + θB,T ≤ β).Do
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V δ(v˜, Yr, r) and employing the standard dynamic programming arguments yield the following
formal HJB equation for V δ:
(2.8) −Vt(vn, y, t)−H(vn, y, t, V ) = 0, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (y, t) ∈ δZ × [0, 1),
where the Hamilton H is deﬁned as (the v˜ argument is omitted in H to simplify notation)
H(vn, y, t, V ) := (V (y + δ, t)− 2V (y, t) + V (y − δ, t))β
+ sup
θB,B≥0
[
V (y + δ, t) − V (y, t) + (vn − p(y + δ, t))δ
]
θB,B
+ sup
θB,T≥0
[
V (y + 2δ, t) − V (y + δ, t) + (vn − p(y + 2δ, t))δ
]
θB,T
+ sup
θB,S≥0
[
V (y, t)− V (y − δ, t) + (vn − p(y, t))δ
]
θB,S
+ sup
θS,S≥0
[
V (y − δ, t)− V (y, t)− (vn − p(y − δ, t))δ
]
θS,S
+ sup
θS,T≥0
[
V (y − 2δ, t) − V (y − δ, t) − (vn − p(y − 2δ, t))δ
]
θS,T
+ sup
θS,B≥0
[
V (y, t)− V (y + δ, t) − (vn − p(y, t))δ
]
θS,B.
(2.9)
Optimizers θi,j, i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B,T, S}, in (2.9), are deterministic functions of vn, y, and
t; hence they are of feedback form. They are expected to be the optimal control intensities
for (2.7). This is indeed the case in many existing results in the Kyle model and the Glosten–
Milgrom model (with N = 2); compare [16], [2], [4], [3], and [9]. However, when N ≥ 3 in
the Glosten–Milgrom model, the following theorem shows any optimizers in (2.9) are not the
optimal intensities when v˜ is neither v1 nor vN .
Theorem 2.6. Let N ≥ 3 and v˜δ satisfy Assumption 2.4. Let pδ in (2.5) be the pricing
rule and satisfy Assumption 2.5. Then any optimizers θi,j(y, t), i ∈ {B,S}, j ∈ {B,T, S},
and (y, t) ∈ δZ × [0, 1), for (2.9) are not the optimal strategy for (2.7) when v˜δ = vn for
1 < n < N .
Remark 2.7. When v˜δ = v1 (resp., vN ), the insider knows the risky asset is always over-
priced (resp., underpriced). Hence she always sells (resp., buys) in equilibrium. This situation
is exactly the same as [9]. For when v˜δ is neither minimal nor maximal, let us brieﬂy describe
the proof of Theorem 2.6 here. To ensure (2.8) is well posed, H must be ﬁnite for all (y, t) ∈
δZ× [0, 1). Hence
(2.10) (p(y, t)− vn)δ ≤ V (y+ δ, t)− V (y, t) ≤ (p(y+ δ, t)− vn)δ for all (y, t) ∈ δZ× [0, 1),
where the second inequality comes from the ﬁrst three maximizations in (2.9) and the ﬁrst
inequality comes from the last three. Since the optimal value V is positive, then θi,j ≡ 0,
i ∈ {B,S}, and j ∈ {B,T, S} in (2.9) does not correspond to the optimal strategy, hence
there must exist (y0, t0) such that one inequality in (2.10), say, the ﬁrst one, is an equality.
However, in this case, the discrete state space forces the ﬁrst inequality to be an equality for
all (y, t) ∈ δZ× [0, 1), which implies the second inequality in (2.10) is strict for all (y, t), due
to p(y+ δ, t) > p(y, t). Therefore the optimizers in the ﬁrst three maximizations in (2.9) mustD
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be identically zero, which means the associated point process X does not have positive jumps.
On the other hand, the dynamic programming principle and the boundary layer of (2.8) at
t = 1 force Y1 = Z1 +X1 ∈ [aδn + δ, aδn+1] a.s. This can never happen when X does not have
positive jumps. Therefore, Theorem 2.6 is the joint eﬀort of the discrete state space and the
boundary layer of the HJB equation.
Remark 2.8. The statement of Theorem 2.6 remains valid when the insider is prohibited
from trading with noise traders at the same time; i.e., XB,T ,XB,S ,XS,T , XS,B are all zero. In
this case, the second, third, ﬁfth, and sixth maximizations do not present in (2.9). However,
the ﬁrst and fourth maximizations therein still lead to (2.10). Hence the same argument as
in the previous remark still applies.
Remark 2.9. Examples of control problems without optimal feedback control exist in the
literature of the optimal control theory; cf., e.g., [21, Chapter 3, p. 246] and [17, Example 1.1].
In these cases, the notion of relaxed control is employed to prove the existence of a relaxed
optimal control; cf. [17] and references therein. For the insider’s optimization problem, instead
of {θ : δZ× [0, 1] → R+}, the control set can be relaxed to {θ : δZ× [0, 1] → M1(R+)}, where
M1(R+) is the set of all probability measures in R+. It is interesting to investigate whether
(2.7) admits an optimal control in this relaxed set. We leave this topic to future studies.
2.3. Asymptotic Glosten–Milgrom equilibrium. To establish equilibrium of Glosten–
Milgrom type when the risky asset v˜ has general discrete distribution (1.1) with N ≥ 3,
we introduce a weak form of equilibrium in what follows. To motivate this deﬁnition, we
recall the convergence of Glosten–Milgrom equilibria as the order size decreasing to zero and
intensity of noise trades increasing to inﬁnity; cf. [3, Theorem 3] and [9, Theorem 5.3].
Proposition 2.10. For any Bernoulli distributed v˜ (i.e., N = 2 in (1.1)), there exists a
sequence of Bernoulli distributed random variables v˜δ such that
(i) v˜δ converges to v˜ in law as δ ↓ 0;
(ii) for each δ > 0, model with v˜δ as the fundamental value of the risky asset admits a
Glosten–Milgrom equilibrium (pδ,XB,δ ,XS,δ,FI,δ);
(iii) when the intensity of Poisson process is given by βδ := (2δ2)−1, XB,δ−XS,δ L−→ X0,
as δ ↓ 0, where X0 is the optimal strategy in the Kyle model and L−→ represents the weak
convergence of stochastic processes.7
This result motivates us to deﬁne the following weak form of Glosten–Milgrom equilibrium.
Definition 2.11. For any v˜ with discrete distribution (1.1), an asymptotic Glosten–Milgrom
equilibrium is a sequence (v˜δ , pδ,XB,δ ,XS,δ,FI,δ)δ>0 such that
(i) v˜δ converges to v˜ in law as δ ↓ 0;
(ii) for each δ > 0, given (v˜δ,XB,δ ,XS,δ,FI,δ) and setting Y δ := Zδ +XB,δ −XS,δ, pδ
is a rational pricing rule, i.e., pδ(Y δt , t) = E[v˜
δ | FY δt ] for t ∈ [0, 1];
(iii) given (v˜δ, pδ) and βδ = (2δ2)−1, let J δ(XB ,XS) be an insider’s expected proﬁt asso-
ciated to the admissible strategy (XB ,XS). Then
sup
(XB ,XS) admissible
J δ(XB ,XS)− J δ(XB,δ ,XS,δ) → 0 as δ ↓ 0.
7Refer to [5] or [14] for the deﬁnition of weak convergence of stochastic processes.D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
02
/2
6/
16
 to
 1
58
.1
43
.1
97
.1
0.
 R
ed
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
su
bje
ct 
to 
SIA
M 
lic
en
se 
or 
co
py
rig
ht;
 se
e h
ttp
://w
ww
.si
am
.or
g/j
ou
rna
ls/
ojs
a.p
hp
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © by SIAM. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited. 
ASYMPTOTIC GLOSTEN–MILGROM EQUILIBRIUM 251
In the above deﬁnition, rationality of the pricing mechanism is not compromised. How-
ever, optimality of the insider’s strategy is not enforced. Instead, item (iii) requires that when
the order size is small, the loss of the insider’s expected proﬁt by employing the strategy
(XB,δ,XS,δ;Fδ,I) is small, compared to the optimal value. Moreover, this discrepancy con-
verges to zero when the order size vanishes. Therefore if the insider is willing to give up a
small amount of expected proﬁt, she can employ the strategy (XB,δ ,XS,δ;FI,δ) to establish
a suboptimal equilibrium. The following result establishes the existence of equilibrium in the
above weak sense.
Theorem 2.12. Assume that v˜ satisﬁes (1.1) with N < ∞. Then the asymptotic Glosten–
Milgrom equilibrium exists.
In this asymptotic equilibrium, the pricing rule is given by (2.5). When the order size is
δ, the insider employs the strategy (XB,δ,XS,δ;FI,δ) with FI,δ-intensities
δβδ
N∑
n=1
I{v˜δ=vn}
[
hδn(Y
δ
t− + δ, t)
hδn(Y
δ
t−, t)
− 1
]
+
+ δβδ
N∑
n=1
I{v˜δ=vn}
[
hδn(Y
δ
t− − δ, t)
hδn(Y
δ
t−, t)
− 1
]
−
,
δβδ
N∑
n=1
I{v˜δ=vn}
[
hδn(Y
δ
t− − δ, t)
hδn(Y
δ
t−, t)
− 1
]
+
+ δβδ
N∑
n=1
I{v˜δ=vn}
[
hδn(Y
δ
t− + δ, t)
hδn(Y
δ
t−, t)
− 1
]
−
,
(2.11)
respectively. In particular, when the fundamental value is vn, the insider trades toward the
middle level mδn := (a
δ
n + a
δ
n+1 − δ)/2 of the interval [aδn, aδn+1): when the total demand is
less than mδn, the insider only places buy orders by either complementing noise buy orders
or canceling some of noise sell orders; when the total demand is larger than mδn, the insider
does exactly the opposite. More speciﬁcally, Lemma 5.2 below shows that y → hδn(y, t) is
strictly increasing when y < mδn and strictly decreasing when y > m
δ
n. Therefore, when
Y δt− < mδn, (2.11) implies that XB,B,δ has intensity
1
2δ (
hδn(Y
δ
t−+δ,t)
hδn(Y
δ
t−,t)
− 1), XB,S,δ has intensity
1
2δ (1−
hδn(Y
δ
t−−δ,t)
hδn(Y
δ
t−,t)
); meanwhile intensities of XS,S,δ and XS,B,δ are both zero. When Y δr− > mδn,
intensities can be read out from (2.11) similarly. Even though Theorem 2.6 remains valid
when the insider is prohibited from trading at the same time with noise traders, the strategy
constructed above depends on the possibility of canceling orders. However, in this strategy,
the insider never tops up noise orders, i.e., XB,T = XS,T ≡ 0. This allows the market maker
to employ a rational pricing mechanism so that Deﬁnition 2.11(ii) is satisﬁed; cf. Remark 4.6
below.
The processes (XB,δ ,XS,δ;FI,δ) with intensities (2.11) will be constructed explicitly in
section 5. The insider employs a sequence of independent random variables with uniform
distribution on [0, 1] to construct her mixed strategy. This sequence of random variables
is also independent of Zδ and v˜δ. This construction is a natural extension of [9]. In this
construction, whenever a noise order arrives, the insider uses a uniform distributed random
variable to decide whether to submit an opposite canceling order. Hence this strategy is
adapted to insider’s ﬁltration, rather than predictable as in the Kyle model. Such a canceling
strategy is called input regulation and has been studied extensively in the queueing theory
literature; see, e.g., [7, Chapter VII, section 3].D
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Figure 1. The mean and standard deviation of the upper bound for the insider’s expected proﬁt loss. The
ﬁgure is generated by Monte Carlo simulation with 105 paths.
When the fundamental value is vn and the insider follows the aforementioned strategy, the
total demand at time 1 will end up in the interval [aδn, a
δ
n+1). Therefore the insider’s private
information is fully, albeit gradually, revealed to the public so that the trading price does
not jump when the fundamental value is announced. On the other hand, the total demand,
in its own ﬁltration, has the same distribution of the demand from noise traders, i.e., the
insider is able to hide her trades among the noise trades. This is another manifestation of the
inconspicuous trading theorem commonly observed in the insider trading literature (cf., e.g.,
[16], [2], [4]).
The insider’s strategy discussed above is of feedback form. The insider can determine
her trades only using the current total cumulative demand (and some additional randomness
coming from the sequence of independent and identically distributed (iid) uniform distributed
random variables which are also independent of the fundamental value and the noise trades).
Even though this strategy is not optimal, its associated expected proﬁt is close to the optimal
value when the order size is small. Moreover the discrepancy converges to zero as the order
size diminishes.
The following numeric example illustrates the convergence of the upper bound for the
insider’s expected proﬁt loss as the order size decreases to zero. In this example, v˜ takes
values in {1, 2, 3} with probability 0.55, 0.35, and 0.1, respectively. The expected proﬁt in
the Kyle–Back equilibrium is 0.512. Compared to this, Figure 1 shows that the loss to the
insider’s expected proﬁt is small.
Finally, similar to Proposition 2.10(iii), the insider’s net order in the asymptotic Glosten–
Milgrom equilibrium converges to the optimal strategy in the Kyle model as the order size
decreases to zero.D
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Theorem 2.13. Let (XB,δ ,XS,δ,FI,δ)δ>0 be the sequence of the insider’s strategy in Theo-
rem 2.12. Then
XB,δ −XS,δ L−→ X0 as δ ↓ 0,
where X0 is the optimal strategy in Kyle model.
3. Optimizers in the HJB equation are not optimal control. Theorem 2.6 will be proved
in this section. Let us ﬁrst make the heuristic argument for the HJB equation rigorous by
using the dynamic programming principle and standard arguments for viscosity solutions. To
this end, recall the domain of Hamilton:
dom(H) := {(vn, y, t, V ) ∈ {v1, . . . , vN} × δZ × [0, 1] × R
− valued functions |H(vn, y, t, V ) < ∞} .
Observe that control variables for (2.9) are chosen in [0,∞). Hence (vn, y, t, V ) ∈ dom(H) if
V (y + δ, t) − V (y, t) + (vn − p(y + δ, t))δ ≤ 0,(3.1)
V (y − δ, t) − V (y, t)− (vn − p(y − δ, t))δ ≤ 0.(3.2)
Moreover, when (vn, y, t, V ) ∈ dom(H), the Hamilton is reduced to
(3.3) H(vn, y, t, V ) = (V (y + δ, t) − 2V (y, t) + V (y − δ, t))β.
Hence (2.8) reads
(3.4) −Vt − (V (y + δ, t) − 2V (y, t) + V (y − δ, t))β = 0 in dom(H).
Proposition 3.1. The following statements hold for V δ, δ > 0:
(i) V δ is a viscosity solution of (2.8).
(ii) (vn, y, t, V
δ) ∈ dom(H) for any n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and (y, t) ∈ δZ × [0, 1). Hence V δ
satisﬁes (3.1), (3.2), and is a viscosity solution of (3.4).
(iii) t → V δ(y, t) is continuous on [0, 1].
(iv) V δ(y, t) = EP
δ,y
[V δ(Zs−t, s)] for any y ∈ δZ, and 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ 1.
The proof is postponed to Appendix A, where the dynamic programming principle together
with the deﬁnition of viscosity solutions is recalled. The proof of Theorem 2.6 also requires
the following result.
Lemma 3.2. For any δ > 0, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and (y, t) ∈ δZ × [0, 1), V δ(vn, y, t) > 0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we ﬁx δ = 1, v˜ = vn for some n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and
(y, t) = (0, 0). The superscript δ is omitted throughout this proof. When n > 1, let us
construct a strategy where the insider buys once the asset is underpriced. Consider
τ := inf{r : p(Zr− + 1, r) < vn)} ∧ 1 and σ := inf{r > τ : ΔYr = 0} ∧ 1.
Here τ is the ﬁrst time that the asset is underpriced and σ is the arrival time of the ﬁrst
order after τ . The insider employs a strategy with intensity θB,Br = I{τ≤r≤σ} and all other
intensities zero. Then the associated expected proﬁt is
E
[∫ 1
0
(vn − a(Yr−, r)) I{τ≤r≤σ}dr
]
= E
[∫ σ
τ
(vn − p(Zr− + 1, r)) dr
]
> 0,
D
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where the inequality follows from the deﬁnition of τ and the fact that P(τ < 1) > 0 due to
Deﬁnition 2.1(ii). When n = 1, set τ := inf{t : p(Zt−−1, t) > v1}∧1 and θS,St = I{τ≤t≤σ}. An
argument similar to the above shows that this selling strategy also leads to positive expected
proﬁt. Therefore, in both cases, V > 0 is veriﬁed.
Proof of Theorem 2.6. Without loss of generality, we set δ = 1 and omit the superscript
δ throughout the proof.
Step 1. For any n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, either one of the following situations holds:
• (3.1) holds as an equality and (3.2) is a strict inequality at all (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1);
• (3.2) holds as an equality and (3.1) is a strict inequality at all (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1).
To prove the assertion, observe from (3.1) and (3.2) that
p(y, t)− vn ≤ V (y + 1, t)− V (y, t) ≤ p(y + 1, t)− vn, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1).
Since y → p(y, t) is strictly increasing for any t ∈ [0, 1), there exists η(y, t) ∈ [0, 1] such that
V (y + 1, t)− V (y, t) = p(y, t) + η(y, t) (p(y + 1, t) − p(y, t))− vn, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1).
Assume that either (3.1) or (3.2) holds as an equality at some point. If such assumption
fails, both inequalities in (3.1) and (3.2) are strict at all points in Z×[0, 1). Then all optimizers
in (2.9) are identically zero, with the associated expected proﬁt of zero. Since V > 0 (cf.
Lemma 3.2), these trivial optimizers are not optimal strategies for (2.7). Hence the statement
of the theorem is already conﬁrmed in this trivial situation. Let us now assume (3.2) holds
as an equality at (y0 + 1, t0); we will show (3.2) is an identity. On the other hand, combining
the identity in (3.2) and the strict monotonicity of y → p(y, t), we obtain
V (y + 1, t)− V (y, t) = p(y, t)− vn < p(y + 1, t)− vn, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1),
and hence the inequality (3.1) is always strict. The other situation where (3.1) is an identity
and (3.2) is strict can be proved analogously.
Since (3.2) holds as an equality at (y0 + 1, t0), then, for any s ∈ (t0, 1),
Ey0 [p(Zs−t0 , s)]− vn = p(y0, t0)− vn = V (y0 + 1, t0)− V (y0, t0)
= Ey0 [V (Zs−t0 + 1, s)− V (Zs−t0 , s)] ,
where the ﬁrst identity follows from (2.5) and the Markov property of Z, and the third identity
is obtained after applying Proposition 3.1(iv) twice. On the other hand, the deﬁnition of η(y, t)
yields
Ey0 [V (Zs−t0 + 1, s)− V (Zs−t0 , s)]
= Ey0 [p(Zs−t0 , s) + η(Zs−t0 , s) (p(Zs−t0 + 1, s)− p(Zs−t0 , s))]− vn.
The last two identities combined imply
(3.5) Ey0 [η(Zs−t0 , s) (p(Zs−t0 + 1, s)− p(Zs−t0 , s))] = 0.
Recall that η ≥ 0, p(· + 1, s) − p(·, s) > 0 for any s < 1, and the distribution of Zs0−t has
positive mass on each point in Z. We then conclude from (3.5) that η(y, s) = 0 for any y ∈ Z.
Since s is arbitrarily chosen,
(3.6) η(y, s) = 0 for any y ∈ Z, t0 < s < 1.Do
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Now ﬁx s; the previous identity yields, for any t < s and y ∈ Z,
V (y + 1, t)− V (y, t) = Ey [V (Zs−t + 1, s)− V (Zs−t, s)]
= Ey [p(Zs−t, s)]− vn = p(y, t)− vn,
where Proposition 3.1(iv) is applied twice again to obtain the ﬁrst identity. Therefore η(y, t) =
0 for any y ∈ Z and t ≤ s, which combined with (3.6) implies (3.2) is an identity.
Step 2. Fix 1 < n < N . When (3.2) is an identity, any optimizers in (2.9) are shown not
to be the optimal strategy for (2.7). When (3.1) is an identity, a similar argument leads to
the same conclusion. Combined with the result in Step 1, the statement of the theorem is
conﬁrmed.
When (3.2) is an identity, sending t → 1, V (y, 1), deﬁned as limt→1 V (y, t), satisﬁes
V (y − 1, 1)− V (y, 1) = vn − P (y − 1).
The previous identity and (2.6) combined imply that V (y, 1) is strictly decreasing when y <
an+1, constant when y ∈ [an+1, an+1+1), and strictly increasing when y ≥ an+1+1. Thus
y → V (y, 1) attains its minimum value when y ∈ [an + 1, an+1]. Let (XˆB , XˆS) be the point
processes whose FI -intensities are optimizers θˆi,j, i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B,T, S}, in (2.9), and
set Yˆ = Z + XˆB − XˆS . Assuming that (XˆB , XˆS) is the optimal strategy for (2.7), DPP (i)
in Appendix A implies
V (y, t) ≥ Ey,t
[
V (Yˆ1, 1) +
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yˆr− + 1, r))dXˆB,Br +
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yˆr− + 2, r))dXˆB,Tr
+
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yˆr−, r))dXˆB,Sr −
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yˆr− − 1, r))dXˆS,Sr
−
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yˆr− − 2, r))dXˆS,Tr −
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yˆr−, r))dXˆS,Br
]
,
where the expectation is taken under Py,t with Py,t(Yˆt = y) = 1. However, the value function
V (y, t) is exactly the expected proﬁt when the insider employs the optimal strategy (XˆB , XˆS).
Therefore, the previous identity yields
Ey,t[V (Yˆ1, 1)] = 0.
Recall that V (·, 1), as a limit of positive functions, is nonnegative, and it achieves the minimum
at [an + 1, an+1]. The previous identity implies V (y, 1) = 0 when y ∈ [an + 1, an+1] and
(3.7) Yˆ1 ∈ [an + 1, an+1], Py,t-a.s.,
However, when (3.2) is an identity and (3.1) is a strict inequality, any optimizer of (2.9)
satisﬁes θˆB,B = θˆB,S ≡ 0, i.e., XˆB ≡ 0. Therefore, Yˆ = ZB − ZS − XˆS with only negative
controlled jumps from XˆS cannot compensate ZS to satisfy (3.7), where [an + 1, an+1] is a
ﬁnite interval in Z when 1 < n < N .
4. A suboptimal strategy. We start to prepare the proof of Theorem 2.12 from this
section.D
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256 CHENG LI AND HAO XING
For the rest of the paper, N < ∞, assumed in Theorem 2.12, is enforced unless stated
otherwise.
In this section we are going to characterize a suboptimal strategy of feedback form in the
Glosten–Milgrom model with order size δ, such that the pricing rule (2.5) is rational. To
simplify presentation, we will take δ = 1, and hence omit all superscript δ, throughout this
section. Scaling all processes by δ gives the desired processes when the order size is δ.
The following standing assumption on distribution of v˜ will be enforced throughout this
section.
Assumption 4.1. There exists a strictly increasing sequence (an)n=1,...,N+1 such that
(i) an ∈ Z ∪ {−∞,∞}, a1 = −∞, aN+1 = ∞, and ∪Nn=1[an, an+1) = Z ∪ {−∞};
(ii) P(Z1 ∈ [an, an+1)) = P(v˜ = vn), n = 1, . . . , N ;
(iii) the middle level mn = (an + an+1 − 1)/2 of the interval [an, an+1) is not an integer.
Items (i) and (ii) have already been assumed in Assumption 2.4. Item (iii) is a technical
assumption which facilitates the construction of the suboptimal strategy. In the next section,
when an arbitrary v˜ of distribution (1.1) is considered and the order size δ converges to zero,
a sequence (aδn)n=1,...,N+1,δ>0 together with a sequence of random variables (v˜
δ)δ>0 will be
constructed, such that Assumption 4.1 is satisﬁed for each δ and v˜δ converges to v˜ in law. To
simplify notation, we denote by mn := (an+an+1−1)/2 the largest integer smaller than mn
and by mn := (an + an+1 − 1)/2 the smallest integer larger than mn. Assumption 4.1(iii)
implies an ≤ mn < mn < mn < an+1 and mn −mn = 1 when both an and an+1 are ﬁnite.
Let us now deﬁne a function U , which relates to the expected proﬁt of a suboptimal
strategy and also dominates the value function V . First the Markov property Z implies that
p is continuously diﬀerentiable in the time variable and satisﬁes8
pt + (p(y + 1, t)− 2p(y, t) + p(y − 1, t)) β = 0, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1),
p(y, 1) = P (y).
(4.1)
Deﬁne
(4.2) U(vn, y, 1) :=
an−1∑
j=y
(vn−A(j)) I{y≤mn}+
y∑
j=an+1
(B(j)−vn) I{y≥mn}, y ∈ Z, 1 ≤ n ≤ N,
where A(y) := P (y + 1) and B(y) := P (y − 1) can be considered as ask and bid pricing
functions right before time 1. Since (vn)n=1,...,N is increasing, U(·, ·, 1) is nonnegative and
(4.3) U(vn, y, 1) = 0 ⇐⇒ y ∈ [an − 1, an+1 + 1).
Given U(·, ·, 1) as above, U is extended to t ∈ [0, 1) as follows:
U(vn, y, t) := U(vn, y, 1) + β
∫ 1
t
(p(y, r)− p(y − 1, r)) dr, y ≥ mn,(4.4)
U(vn, y, t) := U(vn, y, 1) + β
∫ 1
t
(p(y + 1, r)− p(y, r)) dr, y ≤ mn,(4.5)
for t ∈ [0, 1) and n = 1, . . . , N . Since N is ﬁnite, p is bounded, and hence U takes ﬁnite value.
8This follows from the same argument as in [9, footnote 4].D
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Proposition 4.2. Let Assumption 4.1 hold. Suppose that the market maker chooses p in
(2.5) as the pricing rule. Then for any insider’s admissible strategy (XB ,XS ;FI), with
FI-intensities θi,j, i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B,T, S}, the associated expected proﬁt function
J (vn, y, t;XB ,XS) satisﬁes
(4.6) J (vn, y, t;XB ,XS) ≤ U(vn, y, t)− L(vn, y, t), n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1],
where
L(vn, y, t) := E
y
[ ∫ 1
t
(vn − p(mn, r))
[(
β − θB,Sr + θS,Sr
)
I{Yr−=mn}
+ θS,Tr I{Yr−=mn+1}
]
dr
∣∣∣v˜ = vn
]
− Ey
[ ∫ 1
t
(vn − p(mn, r))
[(
β − θS,Br + θB,Br
)
I{Yr−=mn}
+ θB,Tr I{Yr−=mn−1}
]
dr
∣∣∣v˜ = vn
]
.
(4.7)
Moreover (4.6) is an identity when the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) Y1 ∈ [an − 1, an+1 + 1) a.s. when v˜ = vn;
(ii) XS,St = X
S,B
t ≡ 0 when Yt− ≤ mn, XB,Bt = XB,St ≡ 0 when Yt− ≥ mn, θB,T ≡ 0
when y ≥ mn, and θS,T ≡ 0 when y ≤ mn.
Before proving this result, let us derive equations that U satisﬁes. The following result
shows that U satisﬁes (3.4) except when y = mn and y = mn, and U satisﬁes the identity in
either (3.1) or (3.2) depending on whether y ≤ mn or y ≥ mn.
Lemma 4.3. The function U satisﬁes the following equations (here v˜ = vn is ﬁxed and the
dependence on v˜ is omitted in U):
Ut + (U(y + 1, t) − 2U(y, t) + U(y − 1, t)) β = 0, y > mn or y < mn,(4.8)
Ut + (U(y + 1, t) − 2U(y, t) + U(y − 1, t)) β = (p(mn, t)− vn)β, y = mn,(4.9)
Ut + (U(y + 1, t) − 2U(y, t) + U(y − 1, t)) β = (vn − p(mn, t))β, y = mn,(4.10)
U(y, t)− U(y + 1, t) − (vn − p(y, t)) = 0, y ≥ mn,(4.11)
U(y, t)− U(y − 1, t) + (vn − p(y, t)) = 0, y ≤ mn.(4.12)
Proof. We will verify these equations only when y ≥ mn. The remaining equations can be
proved similarly. First (4.2) implies
U(y + 1, 1) − U(y, 1) = B(y + 1)− vn = P (y)− vn, y ≥ mn.
Combining the previous identity with (4.4),
U(y + 1, t)− U(y, t) = U(y + 1, 1) − U(y, 1)
+ β
∫ 1
t
(p(y + 1, r)− 2p(y, r) + p(y − 1, r)) dr
= p(y, t)− vn,
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258 CHENG LI AND HAO XING
where (4.1) is used to obtain the second identity. This veriﬁes (4.11). When y > mn, summing
up (4.11) at y and y + 1 and taking the time derivative in (4.4) yield
Ut + (U(y + 1, t)− 2U(y, t) + U(y − 1, t)) β
= −β(p(y, t)− p(y − 1, t)) + β(p(y, t)− p(y − 1, t))
= 0,
which conﬁrms (4.8) when y > mn. When y = mn, observe from (4.2), (4.4), and (4.5) that
U(mn, ·) = U(mn, ·). Then
Ut + (U(y + 1, t)− 2U(y, t) + U(y − 1, t)) β
= −β (p(mn, t)− p(mn, t)) + β (U(mn + 1, t) − U(mn, t))
= −β (p(mn, t)− p(mn, t))− β (vn − p(mn, t))
= β (p(mn, t)− vn) ,
where the second identity follows from (4.11).
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Throughout the proof the v˜ = vn is ﬁxed and the dependence on
v˜ is omitted in U . Let Y B = ZB+XB,B+XB,T −XS,B and Y S = ZS+XS,S+XS,T −XB,S be
positive and negative parts of Y , respectively. Then Y B − ∫ ·0(β− θS,Br − θB,Tr )dr− ∫ ·0 θB,Br dr−
2
∫ ·
0 θ
B,T
r dr and Y S−
∫ ·
0(β−θB,Sr −θS,Tr )dr−
∫ ·
0 θ
S,S
r dr−2
∫ ·
0 θ
S,T
r dr are FI -martingales. Applying
Itoˆ’s formula to U(Y·, ·), we obtain
U(Y1, 1) = U(y, t) +
∫ 1
t
Ut(Yr−, r)dr
+
∫ 1
t
[U(Yr, r)− U(Yr−, r)] dY Br +
∫ 1
t
[U(Yr, r)− U(Yr−, r)] dY Sr
= U(y, t) +
∫ 1
t
[Ut(Yr−, r) + (U(Yr− + 1, r)− 2U(Yr−, r) + U(Yr− − 1, r)) β] dr
+
∫ 1
t
[U(Yr− + 1, r)− U(Yr−, r)]
(
θB,Br − θS,Br
)
dr
+
∫ 1
t
[U(Yr− + 2, r)− U(Yr− + 1, r)] θB,Tr dr
+
∫ 1
t
[U(Yr− − 1, r)− U(Yr−, r)]
(
θS,Sr − θB,Sr
)
dr
+
∫ 1
t
[U(Yr− − 2, r)− U(Yr− − 1, r)] θS,Tr dr +M1 −Mt,
(4.13)
where
M =
∫ ·
0
[U(Yr, r)− U(Yr−, r)] d
(
Y Br −
∫ r
0
(
β − θS,Bu + θB,Bu + θB,Tu
)
du
)
+
∫ ·
0
[U(Yr, r)− U(Yr−, r)] d
(
Y Sr −
∫ r
0
(
β − θB,Su + θS,Su + θS,Tu
)
du
)
.
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Since (4.11) and (4.12) imply U(y+1, t)−U(y, t) is either p(y, t)−vn or p(y+1, t)−vn, which
are both bounded from below by v1 − vn and from above by vN − vn, M is an FI -martingale
(cf. [7, Chapter I, T6]). On the right-hand side of (4.13), splitting the second integral on
{Yr− ≥ mn}, {Yr− = mn}, and {Yr− < mn}, splitting the fourth integral on {Yr− > mn},
{Yr− = mn}, and {Yr− ≤ mn}, utilizing U(mn, ·) = U(mn, ·), as well as diﬀerent equations in
Lemma 4.3 in diﬀerent regions, we obtain
U(Y1, 1) = U(y, t) +
∫ 1
t
(p(mn, r)− vn)βI{Yr−=mn}dr +
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(mn, r)) βI{Yr−=mn}dr
−
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr−, r)) I{Yr−≥mn}(θB,Br − θS,Br )dr
−
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 1, r)) I{Yr−<mn}(θB,Br − θS,Br )dr
−
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 1, r)) I{Yr−≥mn}θB,Tr dr
−
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 2, r)) I{Yr−<mn−1}θB,Tr dr
+
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 1, r)) I{Yr−>mn}(θS,Sr − θB,Sr )dr
+
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr−, r)) I{Yr−≤mn}(θS,Sr − θB,Sr )dr
+
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 2, r)) I{Yr−>mn+1}θS,Tr dr
+
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 1, r)) I{Yr−≤mn}θS,Tr dr +M1 −Mt.
Rearranging the previous identity by putting the proﬁt of (XB ,XS) to the left-hand side, we
obtain
U(y, t)− U(Y1, 1) −K − L+M1 −Mt
=
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 1, r))θB,Br dr +
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 2, r)) θB,Tr dr
+
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr−, r))θB,Sr dr −
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 1, r))θS,Sr dr
−
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 2, r)) θS,Tr dr −
∫ 1
t
(vn − p(Yr−, r))θS,Br dr,
(4.14)
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260 CHENG LI AND HAO XING
where
K =
∫ 1
t
(p(Yr− + 1, r)− p(Yr−, r)) I{Yr−≥mn}θB,Br dr
+
∫ 1
t
(p(Yr−, r)− p(Yr− − 1, r)) I{Yr−≥mn}θB,Sr dr
+
∫ 1
t
(p(Yr− + 2, r)− p(Yr− + 1, r)) I{Yr−≥mn}θB,Tr dr
+
∫ 1
t
(p(Yr−, r)− p(Yr− − 1, r)) I{Yr−≤mn}θS,Sr dr
+
∫ 1
t
(p(Yr− + 1, u)− p(Yr−, r)) I{Yr−≤mn}θS,Br dr
+
∫ 1
t
(p(Yr− − 1, r)− p(Yr− − 2, r)) I{Yr−≤mn}θS,Tr dr,
L =
∫ 1
t
[vn − p(mn, r)]
[
(β − θB,Sr + θS,Sr )I{Yr−=mn} + θS,Tr I{Yr−=mn+1}
]
dr
−
∫ 1
t
[vn − p(mn, r)]
[
(β − θS,Br + θB,Br )I{Yr−=mn} + θB,Tr I{Yr−=mn−1}
]
dr.
Taking conditional expectation E[·|FIt , Yt = y] on both sides of (4.14), the left-hand side is the
expected proﬁt J (XB ,XS), while on the right-hand side, both U(·, 1) and K are nonnegative
(cf. Deﬁnition 2.1(i)). Therefore (4.6) is veriﬁed. To attain the identity in (4.6), we need (i)
Y1 ∈ [an − 1, an+1 + 1) a.s. so that U(Y1, 1) = 0 a.s. follows from (4.3); (ii) θB,B = θB,S ≡ 0
when y ≥ mn, θS,S = θS,B ≡ 0 when y ≤ mn, θB,T ≡ 0 when y ≥ mn, and θS,T ≡ 0 when
y ≤ mn.
Come back to the statement of Proposition 4.2. If the insider chooses a strategy such that
both conditions in (i) and (ii) are satisﬁed, then the identity in (4.6) is attained, hence the
expected proﬁt of this strategy is U − L. On the other hand, deﬁne US : {v1, . . . , vN} × Z×
[0, 1] → R via
(4.15) US(vn, y, t) =
{
U(vn, y, t), y ≥ mn,
U(vn, y − 1, t), y ≤ mn.
The next result shows that US dominates the value function V , and therefore US − U + L is
the upper bound of the potential loss of the expected proﬁt. In section 6, we will prove this
potential loss converges to zero as δ ↓ 0. Therefore, when the order size is small, the insider
loses little expected proﬁt by employing a strategy satisfying Proposition 4.2(i) and (ii).
Proposition 4.4. Let Assumption 4.1 hold. Then V ≤ US, hence V < ∞, on {v1, . . . , vN}×
Z× [0, 1].Do
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Proof. Fix vn and omit it as the ﬁrst argument of U
S and U throughout the proof. We
ﬁrst verify
US(y, t)− US(y + 1, t)− (vn − p(y, t)) = 0,(4.16)
USt +
(
US(y + 1, t)− 2US(y, t) + US(y − 1, t)) β = 0,(4.17)
for any (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1). Indeed, when y ≥ mn, (4.16) is exactly (4.11). When y = mn,
US(mn, t)− US(mn, t) = U(mn − 1, t)− U(mn, t)
= U(mn − 1, t)− U(mn, t) = vn − p(mn, t),
where the second identity follows from U(mn, t) = U(mn, t) and the third identity holds due
to (4.12). When y < mn,
US(y, t)− US(y + 1, t) = U(y − 1, t)− U(y, t) = vn − p(y, t),
where (4.12) is utilized again to obtain the second identity. Therefore (4.16) is conﬁrmed for
all cases. As for (4.17), (4.16) yields
US(y + 1, t)− 2US(y, t) + US(y − 1, t) = p(y, t)− p(y − 1, t).
On the other hand, we have from (4.4) and (4.5) that
USt (y, t) =
{
Ut(y, t) = −β(p(y, t)− p(y − 1, t)), y ≥ mn,
Ut(y − 1, t) = −β(p(y, t)− p(y − 1, t)), y ≤ mn.
Therefore (4.17) is conﬁrmed after combining the previous two identities.
Now note that US(·, 1) ≥ 0; moreover US satisﬁes (4.16) and (4.17). The assertion V ≤ US
follows from the same argument as in the high type of [9, Proposition 3.2].
Having studied the insider’s optimization problem, let us turn to the market maker. Given
(XB ,XS ;FI), Deﬁnition 2.11(ii) requires the pricing rule to be rational. This leads to another
constraint on (XB ,XS ;FI).
Proposition 4.5. If there exists an admissible strategy (XB ,XS ;FI) such that
(i) Y B = ZB+XB,B+XB,T −XS,B and Y S = ZS+XS,S+XS,T −XB,S are independent
FY -adapted Poisson processes with common intensity β;
(ii) [Y1 ∈ [an, an+1)] = [v˜ = vn], n = 1, . . . , N .
Then the pricing rule (2.5) is rational.
Proof. For any t ∈ [0, 1],
p(Yt, t) = E
Yt[P (Z1−t)] = E [P (Z1) |Zt = Yt] = E
[
P (Y1) | FYt
]
= E[v˜ | FYt ],
where the third identity holds since Y and Z have the same distribution, and the fourth
identity follows from (ii) and (2.6).
Remark 4.6. If the insider places a buy (resp., sell) order when a noise buy (resp., sell)
order arrives, Proposition 4.5(i) cannot be satisﬁed. Therefore in the asymptotic equilibrium
the insider will not trade in the same direction as the noise traders, i.e., XB,T = XS,T ≡ 0,
so that the market maker can employ a rational pricing rule.D
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Concluding this section, we need to construct point processes (XB ,XS ;FI) which si-
multaneously satisfy conditions in Proposition 4.2(ii) and Proposition 4.5(i) and (ii).9 This
construction is a natural extension of [9, section 4], where N = 2 is considered, and will be
presented in the next section.
5. Construction of a point process bridge. In this section, we will construct point pro-
cesses XB and XS on a probability space (Ω,FI , (FIt )t∈[0,1],P) such that XB,T = XS,T ≡ 0,
due to Remark 4.6, and satisfy
(i) Y B = ZB +XB,B −XS,B and Y S = ZS +XS,S −XB,S are independent FY -adapted
Poisson processes with common intensity β;
(ii) XB,Bt = X
B,S
t ≡ 0 when Yt− ≥ mn, XS,St = XS,Bt ≡ 0 when Yt− ≤ mn;
(iii) [Y1 ∈ [an, an+1)] = [v˜ = vn] P-a.s. for n = 1, . . . , N .
The construction is a natural extension of [9], where N = 2 is considered. As in [9], XB
and XS are constructed using two independent sequences of iid random variables (ηi)i≥1
and (ζi)i≥1 with uniform distribution on [0, 1]; moreover they are independent of Z and v˜.
The insider uses (ηi)i≥1 to randomly contribute either buy or sell orders and uses (ζi)i≥1 to
randomly cancel noise orders. Throughout this section Assumption 4.1 is enforced. Moreover,
we set δ = 1 and hence suppress the superscript δ. Otherwise XB and XS can be scaled by δ
to obtain the desired processes.
In the following construction, we will deﬁne a probability space (Ω,FI , (FIt )t∈[0,1], P) on
which Y takes the form
(5.1) Y = Z +
N∑
n=1
IAn(X
B −XS).
Here Z is the diﬀerence of two independent FI -adapted Poisson processes with intensity β,
An ∈ FI0 such that P(An) = P(Z1 ∈ [an, an+1)) for each n = 1, . . . , N .
Before constructing XB and XS satisfying desired properties, let us draw some intuition
from the theory of ﬁltration enlargement. Let us deﬁne (D([0, 1],Z),F , (F t)t∈[0,1], P) as the
canonical space where D([0, 1],Z) is Z-valued ca`dla`g functions, P is a probability measure
under which ZB and ZS are independent Poisson processes with intensities β, (F t)t∈[0,1] is
the minimal ﬁltration generated by ZB and ZS satisfying the usual conditions, and F =
∨t∈[0,1]F t. Let us denote by (Gt)t∈[0,1] the ﬁltration (F t)t∈[0,1] enlarged with a sequence of
random variables (I{Z1∈[an,an+1)})n=1,...,N .
In order to ﬁnd the G-intensities of ZB and ZS, we use a standard enlargement of ﬁl-
tration argument which can be found, e.g., in [18]. To this end, recall hn(y, t) = P[Z1 ∈
[an, an+1) |Zt = y]. Note that hn is strictly positive on Z × [0, 1). Moreover the Markov
property of Z implies hn is continuously diﬀerentiable in the time variable and satisﬁes
∂thn + (hn(y + 1, t)− 2hn(y, t) + hn(y − 1, t)) β = 0, (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1),
hn(y, 1) = I{y∈[an,an+1)}.
(5.2)
9Note that Proposition 4.5(ii) implies Proposition 4.2(i).D
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Lemma 5.1. The G-intensities of ZB and ZS at t ∈ [0, 1) are given by
N∑
n=1
I{Z1∈[an,an+1)}
hn(Zt− + 1, t)
hn(Zt−, t)
β and
N∑
n=1
I{Z1∈[an,an+1)}
hn(Zt− − 1, t)
hn(Zt−, t)
β,
respectively.
Proof. We will calculate only the intensity for ZB . The intensity of ZS can be obtained
similarly. All expectations are taken under P throughout this proof. For s ≤ t < 1, take an
arbitrary E ∈ Fs and denote MBt := ZBt − βt. The deﬁnition of hn and the F-martingale
property of MB imply
E
[
(MBt −MBs )IEI{Z1∈[an,an+1)}
]
= E
[
(MBt −MBs )IEhn(Zt, t)
]
= E
[
IE(〈MB , hn(Z·, ·)〉t − 〈MB , hn(Z·, ·)〉s)
]
= E
[
IE
∫ t
s
β (hn(Zr− + 1, r)− hn(Zr−, r)) dr
]
= E
[
IE
∫ t
s
β I{Z1∈[an,an+1)}
hn(Zr− + 1, r)− hn(Zr−, r)
hn(Zr−, r)
dr
]
.
These computations for each n = 1, . . . , N imply that
MB −
∫ ·
s
β
N∑
n=1
I{Z1∈[an,an+1)}
hn(Zr− + 1, r)− hn(Zr−, r)
hn(Zr−, r)
dr
deﬁnes a G-martingale. Therefore the G-intensity of ZB follows from ZBt = MBt + βt.
To better understand intensities in the previous lemma, let us collect several properties
for hn.
Lemma 5.2. Let Assumption 4.1 hold. The following properties hold for each hn, n =
1, . . . , N :
(i) hn(·, ·) = hn(2mn − ·, ·); in particular, hn(mn, ·) = hn(mn, ·).
(ii) y → hn(y, t) is strictly increasing when y ≤ mn and strictly decreasing when y ≥ mn.
Here, when n = 1 (resp., n = N), mn = mn = −∞ (resp., mn = mn = ∞).
Proof. Recall that an + an+1 − 1 = 2mn. Then
hn(y, t) = P[Z1 ∈ [an, an+1) |Zt = y] = P[y + Z1−t ∈ [an, an+1)]
= P[2mn − y − Z1−t ∈ (2mn − an+1, 2mn − an]]
= P[2mn − y − Z1−t ∈ [an, an+1)] = hn(2mn − y, t),
where the last identity holds since Z and −Z have the same distribution. This veriﬁes (i).
To prove (ii), rewrite hn(y, t) = P[Z1−t ∈ [an − y, an+1 − y)]. Then the statement (ii) follows
from the fact that y → P(Z1−t = y) is strictly increasing when y ≤ 0 and strictly decreasing
when y ≥ 0.
In what follows, given An ∈ FI0 such that P(An) = P(Z1 ∈ [an, an+1)), (XB ,XS ; FI) on
An will be constructed so that FI -intensity of Y B (resp., Y S) on An match G-intensities ofDo
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ZB (resp., ZS) on [Z1 ∈ [an, an+1)]. Matching these intensities ensures that (XB ,XS ;FI)
satisﬁes desired properties; cf. Proposition 5.5 below. Recall Y B = ZB +XB,B − XS,B and
Y S = ZS +XS,S −XB,S . Subtracting β from G-intensities of ZB (resp., ZS) in Lemma 5.1,
we can read out intensities of XB,B −XS,B (resp., XS,S −XB,S). Since property (ii) at the
beginning of this section implies that θB and θS are never positive at the same time, when
the intensity of XB,B −XS,B is positive, the insider contributes buy orders XB,B with such
intensity; otherwise the insider submits sell orders XS,B with the same intensity to cancel
some noise buy orders from ZB. Applying the same strategy to XS,S − XB,S and utilizing
Lemma 5.2, we read out FI -intensities for Xi,j , i, j ∈ {B,S}:
Corollary 5.3. Suppose that FI-intensities of Y B and Y S match G-intensities of ZB and
ZS, respectively; moreover XB,Bt = X
B,S
t ≡ 0 when Yt− ≥ mn and XS,St = XS,Bt ≡ 0 when
Yt− ≤ mn. Then FI -intensities of Xi,j , i, j ∈ {B,S}, have the following form on An when
Yt− = y:
θB,B(y, t) =
(
hn(y + 1, t)
hn(y, t)
− 1
)
+
β, θB,S(y, t) =
(
hn(y − 1, t)
hn(y, t)
− 1
)
−
β,
θS,S(y, t) =
(
hn(y − 1, t)
hn(y, t)
− 1
)
+
β, θS,B(y, t) =
(
hn(y + 1, t)
hn(y, t)
− 1
)
−
β.
In particular, θi,j, i, j ∈ {B,S}, satisﬁes the following properties:
(i) θB,B(y, ·) = θB,S(y, ·) ≡ 0, θS,S(y, ·) > 0, and θS,B(y, ·) > 0, when y ≥ mn; θS,S(y, ·) =
θS,B(y, ·) ≡ 0, θB,B(y, ·) > 0, and θB,S(y, ·) > 0, when y ≤ mn;
(ii) θB,B(·, ·) = θS,S(2mn − ·, ·), θB,S(·, ·) = θS,B(2mn − ·, ·);
(iii) θB,B(mn, ·) = θS,S(mn, ·) ≡ 0.
As described in Corollary 5.3, when An ∈ F0 is ﬁxed, the state space is divided into two
domains, S := {y ∈ Z : y ≥ mn} and B := {y ∈ Z : y ≤ mn}. As Y makes excursions into
these two domains, either XS or XB is active. In the following construction, we will focus
on the domain B and construct inductively jumps of XB until Y leaves B. When Y makes
excursions into S, XS can be constructed similarly.
When Y is in B, one of the goals of XB is to make sure that Y1 ends up in the interval
[an, an+1). In order to achieve this goal, X
B will add some jumps in addition to the jumps
coming from ZB . However, this by itself will not be enough since Y also jumps downward due
to ZS. Thus, XB also needs to cancel some of the downward jumps from ZS. Therefore XB
consists of two components XB,B and XB,S , where XB,B complements jumps of ZB and XB,S
cancels some jumps of ZS. Let us denote by (τi)i≥1 the sequence of jump times for Y . These
stopping times will be constructed inductively as follows. Given τi−1 < 1 and Yτi−1 ≤ mn, the
next jump time τi happens at the minimum of the following three random times:
• the next jump of ZB,
• the next jump of XB,B ,
• the next jump of ZS which is not canceled by a jump of XB,S .
Here XB,B and XB,S need to be constructed so that their intensities θB,B(Yt−, t) and
θB,S(Yt−, t) match the forms in Corollary 5.3. This goal is achieved by employing two inde-
pendent sequences of iid random variables (ηi)i≥1 and (ζi)i≥1 with uniform distribution on
[0, 1]. They are also independent of F and (An)n=1,...,N . These two sequences will be used toDo
w
nl
oa
de
d 
02
/2
6/
16
 to
 1
58
.1
43
.1
97
.1
0.
 R
ed
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
su
bje
ct 
to 
SIA
M 
lic
en
se 
or 
co
py
rig
ht;
 se
e h
ttp
://w
ww
.si
am
.or
g/j
ou
rna
ls/
ojs
a.p
hp
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © by SIAM. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited. 
ASYMPTOTIC GLOSTEN–MILGROM EQUILIBRIUM 265
generate a random variable νi and another sequence of Bernoulli random variables (ξj,i)j≥1
taking values in {0, 1}. Let (σ+i )i≥1 and (σ−i )i≥1 be jump time of ZB and ZS, respectively.
Then, after τi−1, the next jump of ZB is at σ+ZBτi−1+1
, the next jump of XB,B is at νi, and the
next jump of ZS not canceled by jumps of XB,S is at τ−i = min{σ−j > τi−1 : ξj,i = 1}. Then
the next jump of Y is at
τi = σ
+
ZBτi−1+1
∧ νi ∧ τ−i .
The construction of νi and (ξj,i)j≥1 using (ηi)i≥1 and (ζi)i≥1 is exactly the same as in [9,
section 4], only replacing h therein by hn.
All aforementioned construction is performed in a ﬁltrated probability space (Ω,FI ,
(FIt )t∈[0,1],P) such that there exist (An)n=1,...,N ∈ FI0 with P(An) = hn(0, 0) and two indepen-
dent sequences of iid FI -measurable random variables (ηi)i≥1 and (ζi)i≥1 with uniform distri-
bution on [0, 1]; moreover these two sequences are independent of both Z and (An)n=1,...,N .
These requirements can be satisﬁed by extending F0 (resp., F) to FI0 (resp., FI). As for the
ﬁltration (FIt )t∈[0,1], we require that it is right continuous and complete under P, and more-
over Z, as the diﬀerence of two independent Poisson processes with intensity β, is adapted to
(FIt )t∈[0,1]. Therefore Z is independent of (An)n=1,...,N , since Z has independent increments.
Finally, we also assume that (FIt )t∈[0,1] is rich enough so that (νi)i≥1 and (τ−i )i≥1 discussed
above are FI -stopping times.
An argument similar to [9, Lemma 4.3] yields the following.
Lemma 5.4. Given point processes (XB ,XS ;FI) constructed above, the FI -intensities of
Y B and Y S at t ∈ [0, 1) are given by
N∑
n=1
IAn
hn(Yt− + 1, t)
hn(Yt−, t)
β and
N∑
n=1
IAn
hn(Yt− − 1, t)
hn(Yt−, t)
β,
respectively.
Now we are ready to verify that our construction is as desired.
Proposition 5.5. The process Y as constructed above satisﬁes the following properties:
(i) [Y1 ∈ [an, an+1)] = An a.s. for n = 1, . . . , N ;
(ii) Y B and Y S are independent Poisson processes with intensity β with respect to the
natural ﬁltration (FYt )t∈[0,1] of Y ;
(iii) (XB ,XS ;FI) is admissible in the sense of Deﬁnition 2.2.
Proof. To verify that Y satisﬁes the desired properties, let us introduce an auxiliary process
(t)t∈[0,1):
t :=
N∑
n=1
IAn
hn(0, 0)
hn(Yt, t)
, t ∈ [0, 1).
When n = 2, . . . , N−1, there is only almost surely a ﬁnite number of positive (resp., negative)
jumps of Y on An when Y· ≥ mn (resp., Y· ≤ mn). Therefore Yt is ﬁnite on these An when
t < 1 is ﬁxed. When n = 1 (resp., n = N), there is a ﬁnite number of positive (resp., negative)
jumps of Y on A1 (resp., AN ) before t. Hence Yt < ∞ on A1 (resp., Yt > −∞ on AN ). This
analysis implies hn(Yt, t) > 0 on An for each n = 1, . . . , N and t < 1. Therefore (t)t∈[0,1) is a
well-deﬁned positive process with 0 = 1.D
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To prove (i), we ﬁrst show that  is a positive FI -local martingale on [0, 1). To this end,
the Itoˆ formula yields that
dt =
N∑
n=1
IAnt−
[
hn(Yt−, t)− hn(Yt− + 1, t)
hn(Yt− + 1, t)
dMBt +
hn(Yt−, t)− hn(Yt− − 1, t)
hn(Yt− − 1, t) dM
S
t
]
,
where t ∈ [0, 1). Here
MB = Y B − β
∫ ·
0
N∑
n=1
IAn
hn(Yr− + 1, r)
hn(Yr−, r)
dr,
MS = Y S − β
∫ ·
0
N∑
n=1
IAn
hn(Yr− − 1, r)
hn(Yr−, r)
dr
are all FI -local martingales. Deﬁne ζ+m = inf{t ∈ [0, 1] : Yt = m} and ζ−m = inf{t ∈ [0, 1] :
Yt = −m}. Consider the sequence of stopping time (ηm)m≥1:
ηm :=
(
I∪N−1n=2 Anζ
+
m ∧ ζ−m + IA1ζ+m + IAN ζ−m
)
∧ (1− 1/m).
It follows from the deﬁnition of hn that each hn(Yt, t) on An is bounded away from zero
uniformly in t ∈ [0, ηm]. This implies that ηm is bounded, hence ηm is an FI -martingale.
The construction of Y yields limm→∞ ηm = 1. Therefore,  is a positive FI -local martingale,
hence also a supermartingale, on [0, 1).
Deﬁne 1 := limt→1 t, which exists and is ﬁnite due to Doob’s supermartingale convergence
theorem. This implies hn(Y1−, 1) > 0 on An. On the other hand, the construction of Y yields
Y S (resp., Y B) does not jump at time 1 P-a.s. when Y1− ≤ mn (resp., Y1− ≥ mn). Therefore
hn(Y1, 1) > 0 on An. However, hn(·, 1) by deﬁnition can only be either 0 or 1. Hence
Y1 ∈ [an, an+1) on An for each n = 1, . . . , N , and the statement (i) is conﬁrmed.
As for the statement (ii), we will prove that Y B is an FY -adapted Poisson process. The
similar argument can be applied to Y S as well. In view of the FI -intensity of Y B calculated
in Lemma 5.4, one has that, for each i ≥ 1,
Y B·∧τi∧1 − β
(∫ ·∧τi∧1
0
N∑
n=1
IAn
hn(Yu− + 1, u)
hn(Yu−, u)
du
)
is an FI -martingale, where τi is the ith jump time of Y . We will show in the next paragraph
that, when stopped at τi ∧ 1, Y B is a Poisson process in FY by showing that (Y Bτi∧t − β(τi ∧
t))t∈[0,1] is an FY -martingale. (Here note that τi is an FY -stopping time.) This in turn will
imply that Y B is a Poisson process with intensity β on [0, τ ∧ 1) where τ = limi→∞ τi is the
explosion time. Since Poisson process does not explode, this will further imply Y Bτ∧1 < ∞ and,
therefore, τ ≥ 1, P-a.s.
We proceed by projecting the above martingale into FY to see that
Y B − β
∫ ·
0
N∑
n=1
P(An|FYr )
hn(Yr− + 1, r)
hn(Yr−, r)
dr
D
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is an FY -martingale when stopped at τi ∧ 1. Therefore, it remains to show that, for almost
all t ∈ [0, 1), on [t ≤ τi],
(5.3)
N∑
n=1
P(An|FYt )
hn(Yt− + 1, t)
hn(Yt−, t)
= 1, P-a.s..
To this end, we will show, on [t ≤ τi],
(5.4) P(An|FYt ) = hn(Yt, t) for t ∈ [0, 1).
Then (5.3) follows since Yt = Yt− only for countably many times.
We have seen that (u∧τi)u∈[0,t] is a strictly positive FI -martingale for each i. Deﬁne a
probability measure Qi ∼ P on FIt via dQi/dP|FIt = τi∧t. It follows from Girsanov’s theorem
that Y B is a Poisson process when stopped at τi∧ t and with intensity β under Qi. Therefore,
they are independent from An under Q
i. Then, for t < 1, we obtain from the Bayes’s formula
that
I{r≤τi∧t}P(An|FYr ) = I{r≤τi∧t}
EQ
i
[IAn
−1
r |FYr ]
EQ
i [−1r |FYr ]
= I{r≤τi∧t}
EQ
i
[IAn
hn(Yr ,r)
hn(0,0)
|FYr ]
EQ
i
[
∑N
n=1 IAn
hn(Yr ,r)
hn(0,0)
|FYr ]
= I{r≤τi∧t}hn(Yr, r),
(5.5)
where the third identity follows from the aforementioned independence of Y and An under Q
i
along with the fact that Qi does not change the probability of FI0 measurable events so that
Qi(An) = P(An) = hn(0, 0). As result, (5.4) follows from (5.5) after sending i → ∞.
Since Y B and Y S are FY -Poisson processes and they do not jump simultaneously by their
construction, they are then independent. To show the strategy (XB ,XS ;FI) constructed is
admissible, it remains to show both E[XB1 IAn ] and E[X
S
1 IAn ] are ﬁnite for each n = 1, . . . , N .
To this end, for each n, E[XB1 IAn ] = E[X
B,B
1 IAn ]+E[X
B,S
1 IAn ], where E[X
B,S
1 IAn ] ≤ E[ZS] <
∞ and E[XB,B1 IAn ] ≤ E[Y B1 IAn ] + E[XS,B1 IAn ] ≤ E[ZB1 |Z ∈ [an, an+1)] + E[ZS1 ] < ∞. A
similar argument also implies E[XS1 IAn ] < ∞. Finally, since N < ∞, p is bounded, Deﬁnition
2.2(iv) is veriﬁed using E[XB1 IAn ],E[X
S
1 IAn ] < ∞ for each n ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
6. Convergence. Collecting results from previous sections, we will prove Theorems 2.12
and 2.13 in this section. Let us ﬁrst construct a sequence of random variables (v˜δ)δ>0, each
of which will be the fundamental value in the Glosten–Milgrom model with order size δ.
Adding to the sequence of canonical spaces (Ωδ,FZ,δ, (FZ,δt )t∈[0,1],Pδ), deﬁned at the be-
ginning of section 2.2, we introduce (Ω0,F0, (F0t )t∈[0,1],P0), where Ω0 = D([0, 1],R) is the
space of R-valued ca`dla`g functions on [0, 1] with coordinate process Z0, and P0 is the Wiener
measure. Denote by P0,y the Wiener measure under which Z00 = y a.s. Let us now deﬁne a
R ∪ {−∞,∞}-valued sequence (a0n)n=1,...,N+1 via
a01 = −∞, a0n = Φ−1 (p1 + · · ·+ pn−1) , n = 2, . . . , N + 1,Do
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where Φ(·) = ∫ ·−∞ 1√2πe−x2/2 dx. Using this sequence, one can deﬁne a pricing rule following
the same recipe in (2.5):
(6.1) p0(y, t) :=
N∑
n=1
vnh
0
n(y, t), y ∈ R, t ∈ [0, 1], n ∈ {1, . . . , N},
where h0n(y, t) := P
0,y(Z01−t ∈ [a0n, a0n+1)) = Φ(a0n+1 − y)− Φ(a0n − y).
As we will see later, this is exactly the pricing rule in the Kyle–Back equilibrium. Moreover,
the sequence (aδn)n=1,...,N+1, associated to (v˜
δ)δ>0 constructed below, converges to (a
0
n)n=1,...,N+1
as δ ↓ 0, helping to verify Deﬁnition 2.11(i).
Lemma 6.1. For any v˜ with distribution (1.1) where N may not be ﬁnite, there exists a
sequence of random variables (v˜δ)δ>0, each of which takes value in {v1, . . . , vN}, such that
(i) Assumption 4.1 is satisﬁed when v˜ therein is replaced by each v˜δ;10
(ii) Law(v˜δ) =⇒ Law(v˜), as δ ↓ 0. Here =⇒ represents the weak convergence of probability
measures.
Proof. For each δ > 0, v˜δ will be constructed by adjusting pn in (1.1) to some p
δ
n, n =
1, . . . , N . Starting from [v˜ = v1], choose a
δ
1 = −∞, aδ2 = inf{y ∈ δZ : Pδ(Zδ1 ≤ y) ≥ p1},
and set Pδ(v˜δ = v1) = P
δ(Zδ1 ∈ [aδ1, aδ2)). Moving on to [v˜δ = v2], choose aδ3 = inf{y ∈ δZ :
Pδ(Zδ1 ≤ y) ≥ p1 + p2 and (aδ2 + y − δ)/2 /∈ δZ} and set Pδ(v˜δ = v2) = Pδ(Zδ1 ∈ [aδ2, aδ3)).
Following this step, we can deﬁne aδn inductively. When N < ∞, we set aδN+1 = ∞. This
construction gives a sequence of random variables (v˜δ)δ>0 taking values in {v1, . . . , vN} such
that Pδ(v˜δ = vn) = p
δ
n := P
δ(Zδ1 ∈ [aδn, aδn+1)) with
∑N
n=1 p
δ
n = 1; moreover each sequence
(aδn)n=1,...,N+1 satisﬁes Assumption 4.1.
It remains to show Law(v˜δ) =⇒ Law(v˜) as δ ↓ 0. To this end, note that aδn is either
the (
∑n−1
i=1 pi)th quantile of the distribution of Z
δ
1 or δ above this quantile. When β
δ is
chosen as 1/(2δ2), it follows from [12, Chapter 6, Theorem 5.4] that Pδ =⇒ P0, in particular,
Law(Zδ1) =⇒ Law(Z01 ). Therefore,
(6.2) lim
δ↓0
aδn = a
0
n, n = 1, . . . , N + 1.
For any  > 0 and n ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the previous convergence yields the existence of a suﬃciently
small δ,n such that [a
0
n + , a
0
n+1 − ) ⊆ [aδn, aδn+1) ⊆ [a0n − , a0n+1 + ) for any δ ≤ δ,n. Hence
Pδ
(
Zδ1 ∈ [aδn, aδn+1)
)
≤ Pδ
(
Zδ1 ∈ [a0n − , a0n+1 + )
)
→ P0 (Z01 ∈ [a0n − , a0n+1 − )) ,
Pδ
(
Zδ1 ∈ [aδn, aδn+1)
)
≥ Pδ
(
Zδ1 ∈ [a0n + , a0n+1 − )
)
→ P0 (Z01 ∈ [a0n + , a0n+1 − )) ,
as δ ↓ 0, where both convergences follow from Law(Zδ1) =⇒ Law(Z01 ) and the fact that the
distribution of Z01 is continuous. Since  is arbitrarily chosen, utilizing the continuity of the
distribution for Z01 again, we obtain from the previous two inequalities
lim
δ↓0
Pδ
(
Zδ1 ∈ [aδn, aδn+1)
)
= P0
(
Z01 ∈ [a0n, a0n+1)
)
.
Hence limδ↓0 pδn = p0n for each n ∈ {1, . . . N} and Law(v˜δ) ⇒ Law(v˜).
10When the order size is δ, Assumption 4.1(iii) reads (aδn + a
δ
n+1 − δ)/2 /∈ δZ.Do
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After (v˜δ)δ>0 is constructed, it follows from sections 4 and 5 that a sequence of strategies
(XB,δ,XS,δ;FI,δ)δ>0 exists, each of which satisﬁes conditions in Proposition 4.5. Hence pδ in
(2.5) is rational for each δ > 0. It then remains to verify Deﬁnition 2.11(iii) to establish an
asymptotic Glosten–Milgrom equilibrium.
Before doing this, we prove Theorem 2.13 ﬁrst. Let us recall the Kyle–Back equilibrium.
Following arguments in [16] and [2], the equilibrium pricing rule is given by (6.1) and the
equilibrium demand satisﬁes the SDE
Y 0 = Z0 +
N∑
n=1
I{v˜=vn}
∫ ·
0
∂yh
0
n(Y
0
r , r)
h0n(Y
0
r , r)
dr,
where Z0 is a P0-Brownian motion modeling the demand from noise traders. Hence the
insider’s strategy in the Kyle–Back equilibrium is given by
X0 =
N∑
n=1
I{v˜=vn}
∫ ·
0
∂yh
0
n(Y
0
r , r)
h0n(Y
0
r , r)
dr.
Proof of Theorem 2.13. As we have seen in Lemma 6.1, Assumption 4.1 is satisﬁed by each
v˜δ. It then follows from Proposition 5.5(i) and (ii) that the distribution of Y δ on [v˜δ = vn] is
the same as the distribution of Zδ conditioned on Zδ1 ∈ [aδn, aδn+1). Denote Y 0,n = Y 0I{v˜=vn}
as the cumulative demand in the Kyle–Back equilibrium when the fundamental value is vn.
The same argument as in [9, Lemma 5.4] yields
Law(Zδ |Zδ1 ∈ [aδn, aδn+1)) =⇒ Law(Y 0,n), as δ ↓ 0,
for each n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. It then follows
(6.3) Law(Y δ;FI,δ) =⇒ Law(Y 0;FI,0), as δ ↓ 0,
where the ﬁltration FI,0 is F0 initially enlarged by v˜. Recall from (5.1) that Y δ = Zδ +
XB,δ −XS,δ, and moreover Y 0 = Z0 +X0. Combining (6.3) with Law(Zδ) =⇒ Law(Z0), we
conclude from [14, Proposition VI.1.23] that Law(XB,δ −XS,δ) =⇒ Law(X0) as δ ↓ 0.
In the rest of the section, Deﬁnition 2.11(iii) is veriﬁed for strategies (XB,δ,XS,δ; FI,δ)δ>0,
which concludes the proof of Theorem 2.12. We have seen in Proposition 4.2 that the expected
proﬁt of the strategy (XB,δ ,XS,δ;FI,δ), constructed in section 5, satisﬁes
J δ(vn, 0, 0;XB,δ ,XS,δ) = U δ(vn, 0, 0) − Lδ(vn, 0, 0), n ∈ {1, . . . , N},
where
Lδ(vn, 0, 0) = δβ
δ Eδ,0
[∫ 1
0
(vn − pδ(mδn, r)) I{Y δr−=mδn}dr
∣∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn
]
− δβδ Eδ,0
[∫ 1
0
(vn − pδ(mδn, r)) I{Y δr−=mδn}dr
∣∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn
]
.
(6.4)
This expression for Lδ follows from changing the order size in (4.7) from 1 to δ and utilizing
θB,S,δ(mδn, ·) = θS,S,δ(mδn, ·) = θS,B,δ(mδn, ·) = θB,B,δ(mδn, ·) = 0 from Corollary 5.3(i) and (iii),Do
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θB,T,δ = θS,T,δ ≡ 0 from Remark 4.6, and the expectations are taken under Pδ,0. Here mδn :=
δ(an + an+1 − δ)/2δ is the largest integer multiple of δ smaller than mδn and mδn := δ(an +
an+1 − δ)/2δ is the smallest integer multiple of δ larger than mδn. To prove Theorem 2.13,
let us ﬁrst show
(6.5) lim
δ↓0
Lδ(vn, 0, 0) = 0, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
In the following development, we ﬁx vn and denote L
δ = Lδ(vn, 0, 0).
Before presenting technical proofs for (6.5), let us ﬁrst introduce a heuristic argument.
First, since βδ = 1/(2δ2), (6.4) can be rewritten as
(6.6) Lδ = Eδ,0
[
I
δ,n
1
∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn]− Eδ,0 [Iδ,n1 ∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn] ,
where
I
δ,n
· =
∫ ·
0
(vn − pδ(Y δr− − δ, r)) dLδ,m
δ
n
r , I
δ,n
· =
∫ ·
0
(vn − pδ(Y δr− + δ, r)) dLδ,m
δ
n
r ,
and Lδ,y· = 12δ
∫ ·
0 I{Y δr−=y}dr is the scaled occupation time of Y
δ at level y. Here Y δ is, in its
natural ﬁltration, the diﬀerence of two independent Poisson Y B,δ and Y S,δ with jump size δ
and intensity βδ; cf. Proposition 5.5(ii). For the integrands in I
δ,n
and Iδ,n, we expect that
vn−pδ(Y δ· ±δ, ·) L−→ vn−p0(Y 0· , ·), where Y 0 is a P0-Brownian motion. As for the integrators,
we will show both Lδ,mδn· and Lδ,m
δ
n· converge weakly to Lmn· , which is the Brownian local time
at level mn := (a
0
n + a
0
n+1)/2. Then the weak convergence of both integrands and integrators
yields
I
δ,n
· and I
δ,n
·
L−→ I0,n· :=
∫ ·
0
(vn − p0(Y 0r , r)) dLmnr , as δ ↓ 0.
Finally passing the previous convergence to conditional expectation, the two terms on the
right-hand side of (6.6) cancel each other in the limit.
Proposition 6.2. On the family of ﬁltration (FY,δt )t∈[0,1],δ≥0, generated by (Y δ)δ≥0,
pδ(Y δ· ± δ, ·) L−→ p0(Y 0· , ·) on D[0, 1) as δ ↓ 0.
Proof. To simplify presentation, we will prove
(6.7) pδ(Y δ· , ·) L−→ p0(Y 0· , ·) as δ ↓ 0.
The assertions with ±δ can be proved by replacing Y δ by Y δ±δ. First, applying Itoˆ’s formula
and utilizing (4.1) yield
pδ(Y δ· , ·) = pδ(0, 0) +
∫ ·
0
1
δ
(
pδ(Y δr− + δ, r)− pδ(Y δr−, r)
)
dY
B,δ
r
+
∫ ·
0
1
δ
(
pδ(Y δr− − δ, r)− pδ(Y δr−, r)
)
dY
S,δ
r ,
(6.8)
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where Y
B,δ
· = Y
B,δ
· −δβδ · and Y S,δ· = Y S,δ· −δβδ · are compensated jump processes. For pδ(0, 0)
on the right-hand side, the same argument in Lemma 6.1 yields limδ↓0 pδ(0, 0) = p0(0, 0). As
for the other two stochastic integrals, we will show that they converge weakly to
1√
2
∫ ·
0
∂yp
0(Y 0r , r)dW
B
r and −
1√
2
∫ ·
0
∂yp
0(Y 0r , r)dW
S
r , respectively,
where WB and W S are two independent Brownian motions. These estimates then imply the
right-hand side of (6.8) converges weakly to
p0(0, 0) +
∫ ·
0
∂yp
0(Y 0r , r) dWr,
where W = WB/
√
2−W S/√2 is another Brownian motion. Since p0 satisﬁes ∂tp0+ 12∂2yyp0 =
0, the previous process has the same law as p0(Y 0· , ·). Therefore (6.7) is conﬁrmed.
To prove the aforementioned convergence of stochastic integrals, let us ﬁrst derive the
convergence of (pδ(·+ δ, ·) − pδ(·, ·))/δ on R× [0, 1). To this end, it follows from (2.5) that
1
δ
(pδ(y + δ, t)− pδ(y, t))
=
1
δ
N∑
n=1
vn
[
Pδ,y+δ(Zδ1−t ∈ [aδn, aδn+1))− Pδ,y(Zδ1−t ∈ [aδn, aδn+1))
]
=
1
δ
N∑
n=1
vn
[
Pδ,y(Zδ1−t = a
δ
n − δ)− Pδ,y(Zδ1−t = aδn+1 − δ)
]
=
1
δ
N∑
n=1
vn
[
P1,0
(
Z11−t =
aδn − δ − y
δ
)
− P1,0
(
Z11−t =
aδn+1 − δ − y
δ
)]
=
N∑
n=1
vn
⎡
⎣1
δ
e−
1−t
δ2 I∣∣
∣
∣
aδn−δ−y
δ
∣
∣
∣
∣
(
1− t
δ2
)
− 1
δ
e−
1−t
δ2 I∣∣
∣
∣
aδ
n+1
−δ−y
δ
∣
∣
∣
∣
(
1− t
δ2
)⎤⎦
→
N∑
n=1
vn
[
1√
2π(1− t) exp
(
−(a
0
n − y)2
2(1 − t)
)
− 1√
2π(1 − t) exp
(
−(a
0
n+1 − y)2
2(1− t)
)]
= ∂yp
0(y, t), as δ ↓ 0.
Here Z11−t is the diﬀerence of two independent Poisson random variables with common param-
eter (1 − t)βδ = (1 − t)(2δ2)−1 under P1,0. Hence the fourth identity above follows from the
probability distribution function of the Skellam distribution: P1,0(Z11−t = k) = e
−2μI|k|(2μ),
where I|k|(·) is the modiﬁed Bessel function of the second kind and μ = (1− t)(2δ2)−1; cf. [20].
The convergence above is locally uniformly in R× [0, 1) according to [1, Theorem 2]. The last
identity above follows from taking y derivative to p0(y, t) =
∑N
n=1(Φ(
a0n+1−y√
1−t )− Φ(
a0n−y√
1−t)); cf.
(6.1). Combining the previous locally uniform convergence of (pδ(· + δ, ·) − pδ(·, ·))/δ with
the weak convergence Y δ
L−→ Y 0 in their natural ﬁltration, we have from [5, Chapter 1,Do
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Theorem 5.5]
1
δ
(
pδ(Y δ· + δ, ·) − pδ(Y δ· , ·)
) L−→ ∂yp0(Y 0· , ·) on D[0, 1) as δ ↓ 0.
As for the integrators in (6.8), Y
B,δ L−→ WB/√2 and Y S,δ L−→ W S/√2. Moreover, both
(Y
B,δ
)δ>0 and (Y
S,δ
)δ>0 are predictable uniform tight (P-UT), since 〈Y B,δ〉t = 〈Y S,δ〉t = t/2,
for any δ > 0; cf. [14, Chapter VI, Theorem 6.13(iii)]. Then combining weak convergence of
both integrands and integrators, we obtain from [14, Chapter VI, Theorem 6.22] that∫ ·
0
1
δ
(pδ(Y δr− + δ, r)− pδ(Y δr−, r)) dY B,δr L−→
1√
2
∫ ·
0
∂yp
0(Y 0r , r) dW
B
r on D[0, 1) as δ ↓ 0.
A similar weak convergence holds for the other stochastic integral in (6.8) as well. There-
fore the claimed weak convergence of stochastic integrals on the right-hand side of (6.8) is
conﬁrmed.
Having studied the weak convergence of integrands in I
δ,n
and Iδ,n, let us switch our
attention to the integrators Lδ,mδn and Lδ,mδn .
Proposition 6.3. On the family of ﬁltration (FY,δt )t∈[0,1],δ≥0, for any n ∈ {1, . . . , N},
Lδ,mδn L−→ Lmn and Lδ,mδn L−→ Lmn on D[0, 1] as δ ↓ 0.
Proof. For simplicity of presentation, we will prove
(6.9) Lδ,0 L−→ L0 as δ ↓ 0.
Since limδ↓0 mδn = limδ↓0 mδn = mn follows from (6.2), the statement of the proposition follows
from replacing Y δ by Y δ −mδn (or by Y δ −mδn) and Y 0 by Y 0 −mn in the rest of the proof.
To prove (6.9), applying Itoˆ’s formula to |Y δ· | yields
|Y δ· | =
∑
r≤·
(
|Y δr | − |Y δr−|
)
=
∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− + δ| − |Y δr−|
)
d(Y B,δr /δ − βδr)
+
∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− − δ| − |Y δr−|
)
d(Y S,δr /δ − βδr)
+
∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− + δ|+ |Y δr− − δ| − 2|Y δr−|
)
βδdr
=
∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− + δ| − |Y δr−|
)
dY
B,δ
r /δ +
∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− − δ| − |Y δr−|
)
dY
S,δ
r /δ
+
∫ ·
0
1
δ
I{Y δr−=0}dr,
(6.10)
where the third identity follows from |y+ δ|+ |y− δ| − 2|y| = 2δ I{y=0} for any y ∈ R. On the
other hand, the Tanaka formula for Brownian motion is
(6.11) |Y 0· | =
∫ ·
0
sgn(Y 0r ) dY
0
r + 2L0· ,
where sgn(x) = 1 when x > 0 or −1 when x ≤ 0.
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The convergence (6.9) is then conﬁrmed by comparing both sides of (6.10) and (6.11). To
this end, since Y δ
L−→ Y 0 and the absolute value is a continuous function, then |Y δ| L−→ |Y 0|
follows from [5, Chapter 1, Theorem 5.1]. Then (6.9) is conﬁrmed as soon as we prove the
martingale term on the right-hand side of (6.10) converges weakly to the martingale in (6.11),
which we prove in the next result.
Lemma 6.4. Let M δ :=
∫ ·
0
(|Y δr− + δ| − |Y δr−|) dY B,δr /δ+∫ ·0 (|Y δr− − δ| − |Y δr−|) dY S,δr /δ and
M0 :=
∫ ·
0 sgn(Y
0
r ) dY
0
r . Then M
δ L−→ M0 on D[0, 1] as δ ↓ 0.
Proof. Deﬁne f δ(y) := 1δ (|y + δ| − |y|) for y ∈ R and observe
f δ(y) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1, y ≥ 0,
2y/δ + 1, −δ < y < 0,
−1, y ≤ −δ.
It is clear that f δ converges to sgn(·) locally uniformly on R \ {0}. On the other hand,
Y δ
L−→ Y 0 and the law of Y 0 is continuous. It then follows from [5, Chapter 1, Theorem 5.5]
that f δ(Y δ)
L−→ sgn(Y 0). As for the integrators (Y B,δ)δ>0, as we have seen in the proof
of Proposition 6.2, they converge weakly to WB/
√
2 and are P-UT. Then [14, Chapter VI,
Theorem 6.22] implies
∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− + δ| − |Y δr−|
)
dY
B,δ
r /δ
L−→ 1√
2
∫ ·
0
sgn(Y 0r ) dW
B
r .
A similar argument yields
∫ ·
0
(
|Y δr− − δ| − |Y δr−|
)
dY
S,δ
r /δ
L−→ − 1√
2
∫ ·
0
sgn(Y 0r ) dW
S
r .
Here WB and W S are independent Brownian motions. Deﬁning W = WB/
√
2−W S/√2, we
obtain from the previous two convergences that
M δ
L−→
∫ ·
0
sgn(Y 0r ) dWr, which has the same law as M
0.
Propositions 6.2 and 6.3 combined yield the weak convergence of (I
δ,n
)δ>0 and (I
δ,n)δ>0.
Moreover the sequence of local time in Proposition 6.3 also converges in expectation.
Corollary 6.5. On the family of ﬁltration (FY,δt )t∈[0,1],δ≥0, for any n ∈ {1, . . . , N},
I
δ,n
and Iδ,n
L−→ I0,n on D[0, 1) as δ ↓ 0.
Proof. The statement follows from combining Propositions 6.2 and 6.3 and appealing to
[14, Chapter VI, Theorem 6.22]. In order to apply the previous result, we need to show that
both (Lδ,mδn)δ>0 and (Lδ,mδn)δ>0 are P-UT. This property will be veriﬁed for (Lδ,mδn)δ>0. The
same argument works for (Lδ,mδn)δ>0 as well. To this end, since Lδ,mδn is a nondecreasingDo
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process, (Lδ,mδn)δ>0 is P-UT as soon as (V ar(Lδ,mδn)1)δ>0 is tight, where V ar(X) is the vari-
ation of the process X, cf. [14, Chapter VI, 6.6]. Note V ar(Lδ,mδn)1 = Lδ,m
δ
n
1 , since Lδ,m
δ
n is
nondecreasing. Then the tightness of (V ar(Lδ,mδn)1)δ>0 is implied by Proposition 6.3.
Corollary 6.6. For any n ∈ {1, . . . , N} and t ∈ [0, 1],
lim
δ↓0
Eδ,0
[
Lδ,mδnt
]
= lim
δ↓0
Eδ,0
[
Lδ,mδnt
]
= E0,0 [Lmnt ] .
Proof. For simplicity of presentation, we will prove limδ↓0 Eδ,0[Lδ,0t ] = E0,0[L0t ]. Then the
statement of the corollary follows from replacing Y δt by Y
δ
t −mδn or Y δt −mδn in the rest of the
proof. Since the stochastic integrals in (6.10) are Pδ,0-martingales,
2Eδ,0[Lδ,0t ] = Eδ,0[|Y δt |].
Since E[(Y δt )
2] = t for any δ > 0, (|Y δt |;Pδ,0)δ>0 is uniformly integrable. It then follows
from [12, Appendix, Proposition 2.3] and Law(|Y δt |) =⇒ Law(|Y 0t |) that limδ↓0 Eδ,0[|Y δt |] =
E0,0[|Y 0t |]. Therefore the claim follows since E0,0[|Y 0t |] = 2E0,0[L0t ]; cf. (6.11).
Collecting the previous results, the following result conﬁrms (6.5).
Proposition 6.7. For the strategies (XB,δ,XS,δ;FI,δ)δ>0 constructed in section 5,
lim
δ↓0
Lδ(vn, 0, 0) = 0, n ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Proof. Fix any  ∈ (0, 1). Corollary 6.5 implies that Law(Iδ,n1−;FY,δ) =⇒ Law(I0,n1−;F0).
Recall Law(v˜δ) =⇒ Law(v˜) from Lemma 6.1. It then follows that
Law
(
I
δ,n
1− I{v˜δ=vn};FY,δ
)
=⇒ Law
(
I0,n1− I{v˜=vn};F0
)
.
On the other hand, since N is ﬁnite, pδ is bounded uniformly in δ. Then there exists constant
C such that |Iδ,n1−| I{v˜δ=vn} ≤ CL
δ,mδn
1− , where the expectation of the upper bound converges; cf.
Corollary 6.6. Therefore appealing to [12, Appendix, Theorem 1.2] and utilizing limδ↓0 Pδ(v˜δ =
vn) = P
0(v˜ = vn) from Lemma 6.1, we obtain
Eδ,0
[
I
δ,n
1− | v˜δ = vn
]
=
Eδ,0
[
I
δ,n
1− I{v˜δ=vn}
]
Pδ(v˜δ = vn)
→
E0,0
[
I0,n1− I{v˜=vn}
]
P0(v˜ = vn)
= E0,0
[
I0,n1− | v˜ = vn
]
,
(6.12)
as δ ↓ 0. On the other hand, since limδ↓0 Pδ(v˜δ) = P0(v˜ = vn) > 0, there exists a constant C
such that
Eδ,0
[
|Iδ,n1 − Iδ,n1−|
∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn] ≤ C Eδ,0 [Lδ,mδn1 −Lδ,mδn1− ] → C E0,0 [Lmn1 − Lmn1−] ,Dow
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as δ ↓ 0, where the convergence follows from applying Corollary 6.6 twice. For the diﬀerence
of Brownian local time, Le´vy’s result (cf. [15, Chapter 3, Theorem 6.17]) yields
E0,0
[Lmn1 − Lmn1−] = E0,−mn [L01 − L01−]
=
1
2
E0,−mn
[
sup
r≤1
Y 0r − sup
r≤1−
Y 0r
]
=
√
2
π
(1−√1− ),
where Y 0 is a P0-Brownian motion and E0,y[supr≤t Y 0r ] =
√
2t/π + y is utilized to obtain the
third identity. Now the previous two estimates combined yield
(6.13) lim sup
δ↓0
Eδ,0
[
|Iδ,n1 − Iδ,n1−|
∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn] ≤ C(1−√1− ) for another constant C.
Estimates in (6.12) and (6.13) also hold when I
δ,n
is replaced by Iδ,n. These estimates
then yield
Eδ,0
[
I
δ,n
1 − Iδ,n1 | v˜δ = vn
]
≤ Eδ,0
[
I
δ,n
1− − Iδ,n1− | v˜δ = vn
]
+ Eδ,0
[
|Iδ,n1 − Iδ,n1−|
∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn]
+ Eδ,0
[
|Iδ,n1 − Iδ,n1−|
∣∣∣ v˜δ = vn] .
Sending δ ↓ 0 in the previous inequality, the ﬁrst term on the right side vanishes in the limit,
and because both conditional expectations converge to the same limit, the limit superior of
both second and third terms are less than C(1 − √1− ). Now since  is arbitrarily choose,
sending  → 1 yields lim supδ↓0 Eδ,0[Iδ,n1 − Iδ,n1 | v˜δ = vn] ≤ 0. A similar argument leads to
lim infδ↓0 Eδ,0[I
δ,n
1 − Iδ,n1 | v˜δ = vn] ≥ 0, which concludes the proof.
Finally the proof of Theorem 2.12 is concluded.
Proof of Theorem 2.12. It remains to verify Deﬁnition 2.11(iii). Fix vn and (y, t) = (0, 0)
throughout the proof. We have seen from Proposition 4.4 that V δ ≤ US,δ. On the other hand,
Proposition 4.2 yields J (XB,δ ,XS,δ) = U δ − Lδ. Therefore
sup
(XB ,XS) admissible
J δ(XB ,XS)−J δ(XB,δ,XS,δ) ≤ US,δ − U δ + Lδ.
Since limδ↓0 Lδ = 0 is proved in Proposition 6.7, it suﬃces to show limδ↓0 US,δ − U δ = 0. To
this end, from the deﬁnition of US,δ,
(6.14) US,δ(0, 0) − U δ(0, 0) = (U δ(−δ, 0) − U δ(0, 0)) I{0≤mδn} = δ(vn − p
δ(0, 0))I{0≤mδn}.
The second identity above follows from (4.12), which reads U δ(y, t) − U δ(y − 1, t) + δ(vn −
pδ(y, t)) = 0 for y ≤ mδn when the order size is δ. Therefore limδ↓0 US,δ −U δ = 0 is conﬁrmed
after sending δ ↓ 0 in (6.14).
Appendix A. Viscosity solutions. Proposition 3.1 will be proved in this section. To
simplify notation, δ = 1 and v˜ = vn are ﬁxed throughout this section. First let us recall theD
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deﬁnition of the (discontinuous) viscosity solution to (2.8). Given a locally bounded function11
v : Z × [0, 1] → R, its upper-semicontinuous envelope v∗ and lower-semicontinuous envelope
v∗ are deﬁned as
(A.1) v∗(y, t) := lim sup
t′→t
v(y, t′), v∗(y, t) := lim inf
t′→t
v(y, t′), (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1].
Definition A.1. Let v : Z× [0, 1] → R be locally bounded.
(i) v is a (discontinuous) viscosity subsolution of (2.8) if
−ϕt(y, t)−H(y, t, v∗) ≤ 0
for all y ∈ Z t ∈ [0, 1) and any function ϕ : Z× [0, 1] → R continuously diﬀerentiable
in the second variable such that (y, t) is a maximum point of v∗ − ϕ.
(ii) v is a (discontinuous) viscosity supersolution of (2.8) if
−ϕt(y, t)−H(y, t, v∗) ≥ 0
for all y ∈ Z, t ∈ [0, 1) and any function ϕ : Z× [0, 1] → R continuously diﬀerentiable
in the second variable such that (y, t) is a minimum point of v∗ − ϕ.
(iii) We say that v is a (discontinuous) viscosity solution of (2.8) if it is both subsolution
and supersolution.
For the insider’s optimization problem, let us recall the dynamic programming princi-
ple (cf., e.g., [19, Remark 3.3.3]). Given an admissible strategy (XB ,XS), any [t, 1]-valued
stopping time τ , and the fundamental value vn, denote the associated proﬁt by
Int,τ :=
∫ τ
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 1, r))dXB,Br +
∫ τ
t
(vn − p(Yr− + 2, r))dXB,Tr
+
∫ τ
t
(vn − p(Yr−, r))dXB,Sr −
∫ τ
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 1, r))dXS,Sr
−
∫ τ
t
(vn − p(Yr− − 2, r))dXS,Tr −
∫ τ
t
(vn − p(Yr−, r))dXS,Br ,
where Y = Z +XB −XS . Then the dynamic programming principle reads as follows:
DPP (i) For any admissible strategy (XB ,XS) and any [t, 1]-valued stopping time τ ,
V (y, t) ≥ Ey,t[V (τ, Yτ ) + Int,τ ].
DPP (ii) For any  > 0, there exists an admissible strategy (XB ,XS) such that for all
[t, 1]-valued stopping time τ ,
V (y, t)−  ≤ Ey,t[V (τ, Yτ ) + Int,τ ].
11Since the state space Z is discrete, v is locally bounded if v(y, ·) is bounded in any bounded neighborhood
of t and any ﬁxed y ∈ Z.Do
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The viscosity solution property of the value function V follows from the dynamic program-
ming principle and standard arguments in viscosity solutions (see, e.g., [19, Propositions 4.3.1
and 4.3.2]12). Therefore Proposition 3.1(i) is veriﬁed.
Remark A.2. The proof of DPP (ii) utilizes the measurable selection theorem. To avoid
this technical result, one could employ the weak dynamic programming principle in [6]. For
the insider’s optimization problem, the weak dynamic programming principle reads as follows:
WDPP (i) For any [t, 1]-valued stopping time τ ,
V (y, t) ≤ sup
(XB ,XS)
Ey,t
[
V ∗(τ, Yτ ) + Int,τ
]
.
WDPP (ii) For any [t, 1]-valued stopping time τ and any upper-semicontinuous function
ϕ on Z× [0, 1] such that V ≥ ϕ, then
V (y, t) ≥ sup
(XB ,XS)
Ey,t
[
ϕ(τ, Yτ ) + Int,τ
]
.
Conditions A1, A2, and A3 from Assumption A in [6] are clearly satisﬁed in the current
context. Condition A4 from Assumption A can be veriﬁed following the same argument in [6,
Proposition 5.4]. Therefore the aforementioned weak dynamic programming principle holds.
Hence the value function is a viscosity solution to (2.8) following from arguments similar to
[6, section 5.2].
Now the proof of Proposition 3.1(ii) is presented. To prove (vn, y, t, V ) ∈ dom(H), observe
from the viscosity supersolution property of V that H(vn, y, t, V∗) < ∞, hence (vn, y, t, V∗) ∈
dom(H). On the other hand, for any integrable intensities θi,j, i ∈ {B,S} and j ∈ {B,T, S},
due to Deﬁnition 2.2(iv), one can show Ey,t[Int,1] is a continuous function in t. As a supremum
of a family of continuous function (cf. (2.7)), V is then lower-semicontinuous in t. Therefore
V∗ ≡ V , which implies (vn, y, t, V ) ∈ dom(H) for any vn, (y, t) ∈ Z × [0, 1). It then follows
from (3.1) and (3.2) that
(A.2) V (y−1, t)+p(y−1, t)−vn ≤ V (y, t) ≤ V (y−1, t)+p(y, t)−vn for any (y, t) ∈ Z×[0, 1).
Taking limit supremum in t in the previous inequalities and utilizing the continuity of t →
p(y, t), it follows that the previous inequalities still hold when V is replaced by V ∗, which
means (vn, y, t, V
∗) ∈ dom(H) for any vn, (y, t) ∈ Z × [0, 1). As a result, H(vn, y, t, V∗) and
H(vn, y, t, V
∗) have the reduced form (3.3), where V is replaced by V∗ and V ∗, respectively.
Hence Deﬁnition A.1 implies that V is a viscosity solution of (3.4).
To prove Proposition 3.1(iii) and (iv), let us ﬁrst derive a comparison result for (3.4). The
function v : Z× [0, 1] → R has at most polynomial growth in its ﬁrst variable if there exist C
and n such that |v(y, t)| ≤ C(1 + |y|n) for any (y, t) ∈ Z× [0, 1].
Lemma A.3. Assume that u (resp., v) has at most polynomial growth and that it is upper-
semicontinuous viscosity subsolution (resp., lower-semicontinuous supersolution) to (3.4). If
u(·, 1) ≤ v(·, 1), then u ≤ v in Z× [0, 1).
12Therein the stopping time τm can be chosen as the ﬁrst jump time of Y , where Ytm = y for a sequence
(tm)m → t.Do
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Assume this comparison result for a moment. Inequality (A.2) and Assumption 2.5 com-
bined imply that V is of at most polynomial growth. Then Lemma A.3 and (A.1) combined
yield V∗ ≤ V ∗ ≤ V∗, which implies the continuity of t → V (y, t), and hence Proposition 3.1(iii)
is veriﬁed. On the other hand, one can prove V˜ (y, t) := Ey,t [V (Z1, 1)] is of at most polynomial
growth and is another viscosity solution to (3.4).13 Then Lemma A.3 yields
V (y, t) = V˜ (y, t) = Ey,t [V (Z1, 1)] ,
which conﬁrms Proposition 3.1(iv) via the Markov property of Z.
Proof of Lemma A.3. For λ > 0, deﬁne u˜ = eλtu and v˜ = eλtv. One can check u˜ (resp., v˜)
is a viscosity subsolution (resp., supersolution) to
(A.3) −wt + λw − (w(y + 1, t)− 2w(y, t) + w(y − 1, t)) β = 0.
Since the comparison result for (A.3) implies the comparison result for (2.8), it suﬃces to
consider u (resp., v) as the viscosity subsolution (resp., supersolution) of (A.3).
Let C and n be constants such that |u|, |v| ≤ C(1+ |y|n) on Z× [0, 1]. Consider ψ(y, t) =
e−αt(y2n + C˜) for some constants α and C˜. It follows that
−ψt + λψ + (ψ(y + 1, t)− 2ψ(y, t) + ψ(y − 1, t)) β
> e−αt
(
(α+ λ)(y2n + C˜)− 2βy2n
)
> 0
when α+ λ > 2β. Choosing α satisfying the previous inequality, then v + ξψ, for any ξ > 0,
is a viscosity supersolution to (A.3). Once we show u ≤ v + ξψ, the statement of the lemma
then follows after sending ξ ↓ 0.
Since both u and v have at most linear growth
(A.4) lim
|y|→∞
(u− v − ξψ)(y, t) = −∞.
Replacing v by v + ξψ, we can assume that u (resp., v) is a viscosity subsolution (resp.,
supersolution) to (A.3) and
sup
Z×[0,1]
(u− v) = sup
O×[0,1]
(u− v) for some compact set O ⊂ Z.
Then u ≤ v follows from the standard argument in viscosity solutions (cf., e.g., [19, Theo-
rem 4.4.4]), which we brieﬂy recall below.
Assume M := supZ×[0,1](u − v) = supO×[0,1](u − v) > 0 and the maximum is attained at
(x, t) ∈ O × [0, 1]. For any  > 0, deﬁne
Φ(x, y, t, s) := u(x, t)− v(y, s)− φ(x, y, t, s),
where φ(x, y, t, s) :=
1
 [|x− y|2 + |t− s|2]. The upper-semicontinuous function Φ attains its
maximum, denoted by M, at (x, y, t, s). One can show, using the same argument as in
[19, Theorem 4.4.4],
M → M and (x, y, t, s) → (x, x, t, t) ∈ O2 × [0, 1]2 as  ↓ 0.
13Write V˜ (y, t) = E0 [V (Z1−t + y, 1)]. One can utilize the Markov property of Z to show that V˜ is continuous
diﬀerentiable and V˜ is a classical solution to (3.4).D
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Here (x, y, t, s) ∈ O2 × [0, 1]2 for suﬃciently small . Now observe that
• (x, t) is a local maximum of (x, t) → u(x, t)− φ(x, y, t, s);
• (y, s) is a local minimum of (y, t) → v(y, s) + φ(x, y, t, s).
Then the viscosity subsolution property of u and the supersolution property of v imply, re-
spectively,
− 2

(t − s) + λu(x, t)− (u(x + 1, t)− 2u(x, t) + u(x, t)) β ≤ 0,
− 2

(t − s) + λv(y, s)− (u(y + 1, s)− 2v(y, s) + v(y, s)) β ≥ 0.
Taking diﬀerence of the previous inequalities yields
(λ+ 2β)(u(x, t)− v(y, s))
≤ β (u(x + 1, t) + u(x − 1, t))− β (v(y + 1, s) + v(y − 1, s)) .
Sending  ↓ 0 on both sides, we obtain
(λ+ 2β)M = (λ+ 2β)u(x, t)
≤ β (u(x+ 1, t)− v(x+ 1, t))+ β (u(x− 1, t)− v(x− 1, t)) ≤ 2βM,
which contradicts with λM > 0.
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